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ABSTRACT
Authorship and creativity are products of authentic human expression that the law must
encourage in order for works to be produced. The commercial market for literary and
artistic works encourages the creation of diverse works to meet popular consumer
demand. Focus on popular demand may, however, result in works that lack social,
educational and cultural value or utility. Natural law philosophy suggests that the
copyright system should be an ethical and moral institution that would, in turn, promote
the progress of society through authentic authorship. While economic incentives offer
authors market rewards that may facilitate the creation and dissemination, economic
rights represent only a portion of rights, which the copyright system should recognize in
the author. This paper makes the case for the recognition of property rights in the
author's creation, which originating from an author's the act of creativity and authorship,
is a right to the author's literary and artistic creation that is good against the world, and,
if protected, will result in authentic expressions of greater significance upon the progress
of science and the useful arts in society.
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THE AUTHOR'S RIGHTS IN LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS
ALINA NG*

INTRODUCTION: THE STATUTORY RIGHTS

The exclusive statutory rights under the copyright system aim to facilitate the
dissemination of literary and artistic works.1 Section 106 provides authors, as the
first owner of copyright 2 , with the exclusive right to reproduce, make derivatives,
distribute, and publicly perform and display the work. 3 These exclusive rights
protect the positive act of making literary and artistic works available to society for
the promotion of science and the useful arts. 4
Empowered by Constitutional
mandate, Congress protects these specific acts of publicly disseminating works to
facilitate market commercialization of creative works by preventing the general
public from exercising the exclusive rights under section 106 without the permission
of the author or copyright owner.5
The legal entitlement to distribute and
disseminate these works therefore provides an economic privilege that is exclusive to
the author of a work to ensure that monetary rewards for making the work available
to the public may be reaped.6 The entitlement is essentially a state privilege or
incentive granted by Congress to fulfill a larger social and public goal. 7 In economic
analysis, these rights allow authors to recover, first, the fixed costs necessary for the
first production of a work, and, secondly, the marginal costs of production in
8
reproducing the original work for printing, binding, distribution, and dissemination.

* Ms. Ng is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Mississippi College School of Law. The author
is grateful to Mississippi College School of Law for generous research support. The author also
expresses sincere thanks to Professors Donald Campbell and Angela Kupenda for their comments
and suggestions, and to the editors of The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for
inviting the author to contribute to this issue and for their excellent editorial work. This article is
lovingly dedicated, as always, to the author's family.
1 144 CONG. REC. H 9,946, 9,951 (1998).

17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
3 Id. § 106.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106.
6 17 U.S.C. § 106; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor.").
7 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("The monopoly
privileges .... [Are] a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended
to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of their genius .... "); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1953) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the useful
arts."'); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors.").
8 William Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 326-28 (1989) (stating that in the absence of copyright protection, anyone may purchase
copies of works, reproduce and sell them at the marginal cost of production undercutting the initial
2
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Without copyright protection, non-paying members of society will be able use the
work without paying for it, thereby free-riding on the efforts of the author and will
thereby deprive the author of the due market rewards for creating and distributing
the work. 9
The statutory rights under the current copyright system represent modern law
and economics ideals that the recognition of property rights in literary and artistic
works will maximize collective social welfare by allocating scarce resources in the
most economically efficient way. 10 The idea that granting exclusive rights in literary
and artistic creations will result in more of their production is intuitive-authors will
not produce if their works may be appropriated by the public, especially when the
product of their creativity is essentially non-excludable and non-rival.11
The
conceptualization of property rights according to Harold Demsetz's famous 1967
article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 12 exemplifies the economic approach
towards entitlements in literary and artistic works. 13
Demsetz argues that
privatization of common resources and the emergence of private property rights occur
whenever technological and market changes affect the costs and benefits of
internalizing both positive and negative externalities. 1 4 The development of wellcosts of producing the first copy of the work.). Landes and Posner provide an excellent discussion on
the basic economics of the copyright system. See id. at 326-44.
9 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property,IntellectualProperty,and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, FreeRiding (accounting for intellectual property law's theory
of reducing externalities by recognizing property rights in goods that are essentially public goods,
and the economic, legal and practical difficulties).
10See Ejan Mackaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and Innovation, 13
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 873 (1990) ("Property rights are a response to scarcity. Scarcity
manifests itself where people envisage different uses of a resource that are incompatible."); Carol M.
Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emissions Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 134 (1998) ("[L]aw and economics scholars note that the payoffs
from property are very strongly associated with scarcity. Nobody bothers to create property for some
resource that lies around in abundance."); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as IntellectualProperty?, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2000) ("[Tlhe most common justification for granting property rights [is]
to enable market allocations of scarce resources .... ").
11See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property.* Deineating Entitlements in

Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1744 (2007). Professor Smith explains that while information is
considered public good because of its non-rival and non-excludable nature, creating the information
and making it useful requires inputs from the creator, which are rival and "susceptible to efforts to
exclude." Id. Intellectual property regimes, which include the copyright system, "reflect a concern
that, in their absence, people will have too little incentive to engage in certain activities with respect
to information, whether discovering it, commercializing it, or using it to lower consumer search
costs." Id.
12 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofPropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967).
13 See generally id (analyzing the role of property rights through economic theory). See also
Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of PropertyRights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 331, 331 (2002) ("The point of departure for virtually all efforts to explain changes in
property rights is Harold Demsetz's path breaking article .... [it] is still widely cited and
reproduced .. ").
14 Demsetz, supra note 12, at 350.
If the main allocative function of property rights is the internalization of
beneficial and harmful effects, then the emergence of property rights can be
understood best by their association with the emergence of new or different
beneficial and harmful effects...
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defined private hunting territory among the Montagnes Indians, Demsetz
hypothesizes, was the emergence of the fur trade and the need to prevent free
hunting of furry animals in the forest to preserve the trade value of fur as it
increased. 15 Garrett Hardin's article, The Tragedy of the Commons, published a year
later,16 alluded to the same point: unless some form of governance is used to set aside
commonly held resources to private control, men, being economically rational, will
seek to maximize their gains by taking out as much as possible from the commons, or
putting in as much waste as possible without having to bear the cost of cleaning the
commons. 17 As a result of each man acting in his own self-interest, the limited
resources available to all will be exhausted. One way of protecting the commons from
8
complete depletion through overuse is the institution of private property.'
Both articles by Professors Demsetz and Hardin often provide neoclassicists
with the economic foundation to support the privatization of intellectual property and
the expansion of property-type rights in information and knowledge. 19 The logic is
straightforward: without exclusive rights in information and knowledge to protect
... [Piroperty rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. Increased
internalization... results from changes in economic values, changes which stem
from the development of new technology and the opening of new markets ....
Id.
15Id. at 352-53.
16Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243 (1968).
17 Id. at 1244-45.
18See id. at 1247 ("[O]ur legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust-but we
put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better
system. The alternative to the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to
total ruin.").
19Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 314
(1996).
[Tihe inherent inefficiency of the public domain in the neoclassical scheme [cause]
neoclassicists [to] posit that, ideally, all scarce resources should be owned, or
ownable, by someone. Scarce resources that are not subject to individual control
are, in effect, deprived of their social value.... they will necessarily be used in
ways that neither reflect nor enhance their social value.... [this] reflects the
neoclassical assumption that ownerless resources will be exploited without regard
to the externalities arising from their use.
Id.; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 22 (2001) (referring to Hardin's tragedy and asserting that not every commons
justify privatization of resources by stating that "[w]e ... can't jump from the observation that a
resource is held 'in common' to the conclusion that 'freedom in a commons bring ruin to
all.' . . . Where there is a benefit from leaving a resource free, we should see if there is a way to avoid
overconsumption, or inadequate incentives, without its falling under either state or private (market)
control."); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: PrivateIntellectual Property
and the Public Domain, Part , 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 6 (1993) (describing the trend
towards enclosure to protect the information commons and stating that "[w]hile the public domain of
intellectual property has not yet been exhausted or fully enclosed... several disturbing trends
towards this enclosure have continued in U.S. intellectual property law. These trends have
increasingly turned elements of what had ...been considered common culture, ideas and
information into forms of private intellectual property."); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights
Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationshzp 9, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 713, 719-25 (2007) (explaining that the law has generally treated real and intellectual property
within the traditional precepts of property and cites Demsetz's and Hardin's work as having
developed a utilitarian justification for real and intellectual property rights).
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works from being freely appropriable by the public, creativity and innovation will
cease. 2° Creators and inventors will not invest in the production of works, which are
non-rival and non-exclusive, when the public is able to take creative works and use
them without compensating those who invested in their production. 21 By protecting
the exclusive rights under section 106, Congress provides the economic incentives
necessary to encourage creators of literary and artistic based content to produce
works and disseminate them to society through the market within a classic
utilitarian framework. 22 Statutory copyright protection over creative works is
therefore a cost, a temporary monopoly 23, which the public bears "to stimulate
artistic creativity" 24 for society's general good. As statutory rights in literary and
artistic creations are state granted incentives to encourage authors to create and
publicly disseminate works, the bundle of rights granted under section 106, which
allows a copyright owner to perform certain actions with respect to the public
dissemination of the work, appears as a culmination of disaggregated segments of
legal interests in creative works. 25 Through the Copyright Act, a right-holder is
entitled to perform the positive act of making copies of a work, creating derivatives,
distributing, or publicly performing or displaying the work. 26 Statutory rights in
literary and artistic works epitomizes Professor Wesley Hohfeld's conceptualization
of property rights as a mere collection of legally protectable interests in an object,
which defines legal relations among legal actors, rather than ownership of the object
itself.27 Building on the conception of property as an aggregation of rights in the
Hohfeldian sense, contemporary property law scholars dismiss the idea of property as
a "right of ownership" or a "right in a thing' as an antiquated view, and instead
embrace a fragmented "bundle of rights" view in place to represent various abstract
interests to certain uses of a particular thing.28
The statutory rights under
section 106, rather than present a definite legal meaning to the rights of an author in
his literary and artistic creation-the protectable "thing" defined as protectable
subject matter under section 102-is in legal effect, a collection of ad hoc rights that
an author has over what the law regards as "scarce resources." 29 "Property rights"
under the present copyright system, devoid of any particular legal reference to an
20 See

Aoki, supranote 19, at 6; Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 326-29.

21 See

Smith, supra note 11, at 1744.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,

22 See

429 (1984).
23Sony, 464 U.S. 417 at 429; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1,
28 (1979) ("A copyright, like a patent, is a statutory grant of monopoly privileges.").
24 Sony, 464 U.S. 417 at 432.
25 See Alina Ng, The Social Contract and Authorship: Allocating Entitlements in the
Copyright System, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 413, 446-56 (2009) [hereinafter
Ng, Social Contracd (discussing the copyright system as encompassing authors, readers, and
publishers/distributors, each with different legal interests).
26 17 U.S.C. § 106.
27

WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL

REASONING 28-30 (photo. reprint

1978) (1919) (compiling Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) and
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Concepts as Applied in JudicialReasoning,26 YALE
L.J. 719 (1917)).
28Tom Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY:
NOMOS XXII 69-71 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., New York Univ. Press 1980).
29 See id.
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author's rights in relation to the work, suggesting of an in rem right, would be more
appropriately classified as "economic privileges," or in personam rights, to conduct
30
particular actions to make a work publicly available.
The in rem nature of the author's rights in his literary and artistic creations
may have been lost in early development of the copyright system in the United
Kingdom 3' and in this country. 32 The earliest case to address the question of the
author's rights here in the United States is Wheaton v. Peters.33 When Henry
Wheaton, the court reporter and author of twelve volumes of United States Supreme
Court case reports from 1816-1827, brought a copyright infringement action against
his successor as the reporter for the United States Supreme Court, Richard Peters,
Wheaton alleged that Peters's condensation of reports of the United States Supreme
Court cases from the organization of the Court to the commencement of Peters's
report in January 1827 without any significant abbreviation or alteration was a
direct violation of the copyright in his case reports from 1816-1827. 34 The applicable
copyright statutes at that time were the 1790 and 1802 Acts, 35 and the requirements
for seeking the benefit of copyright protection under the Acts were for all authors of
maps, charts or books to deposit the first copy of the work with the clerk's office in
the district court in which the author or copyright proprietor resided, 36 and to deliver
37
to the Secretary of State a copy of the work within six months after its publication.
Attorneys for Peters contended that the exclusive rights in the case reports were
provided for by the Copyright statute and thereby required Wheaton, as the author,
to deposit the reports as a mandatory requirement for protection. 38 Justice McLean,
in giving the decision of the Court, stated that all rights, which an author could
possess in literary and artistic works, were statutorily provided. 39 The constitutional
mandate for Congress to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their

30See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/ContractInterface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 789-92 (2001) (discussing in rem versus in personam rights).
31E.g., Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 218 (K.B.) (holding that the author had a
common law copyright, which is separate from statutory copyright); Donaldson v.Beckett, (1774) 1
Eng. Rep. 837, 843 (H.L.) (holding that the author's right at common law has been replaced by
statutory copyright and could no longer co-exist with statutory copyright); Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26
Eng. Rep. 608, 608 (Ch.) (holding that an author does not part with his property in a composed letter
by sending them to someone else).
32 E.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 592 (1834) (holding that the author only has rights that
are statutorily granted).
33

Id.

34Id. at 593-95.
35See id. at 594.
36

Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 124, 126 (amended 1802) (current version at 17

U.S.C. (2006)).
37Id. § 4.
38 See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 595.
Wheaton delivered eighty copies of the reports to the
Secretary of State under the Reporter's Salary Act, but not under the Copyright Act. Id. at 612. The
Court held that the deposit of eighty copies did not exonerate Wheaton from depositing a single copy
of the report under the Copyright Act. Id. at 667. The deposit of eighty copies did not excuse the
deposit required under the Copyright Act as the eighty volumes were delivered for a different
purpose. Id.
39Id. at 660-61.
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respective writings and discoveries" 40 allowed for the creation of a new right for a
limited time. 41 Congress, according to Justice McLean, by the 1790 Copyright Act did
not sanction an existing property right that authors had in common law. 42 The 1790
Act created new statutory rights to print, reprint, publish and vend instead.4 3 The
decision of Wheaton v. Peters set the tone for the development of future copyright
jurisprudence in the United States, at least with respect to statutory rights being the
only rights authors have in literary and artistic works. The decision provided the
foundation for the current law and economics ideal that carefully calibrated statutory
rights in literary and artistic works will fulfill a fundamentally utilitarian purpose of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. 44 By maximizing collective
social welfare through the creation of a wide spectrum of literature and art, copyright
law fulfils its fundamental goals of advancing public interests through the individual
45
efforts of authors.
Treating rights in literary and artistic works as originating solely from statutory
provisions have a significant impact in how we think about the rights of the author.
Statutory rights affirm the economic basis of the copyright system: by granting
entitlements to copyright owners act exclusively with respect to creative works, the
law implicitly acknowledges the use of specialized entitlements to govern the use of
scarce resources in the tradition of the Coase Theorem. 46 Where the initial allocation
of rights with the copyright owner provide a mechanism to internalize the costs of
producing and disseminating works, 47 statutory rights also facilitate copyright
markets that allow for literary and artistic works to be commercialized. 48 The
possibility of reaching a bargain between copyright owners and the public for the use
of creative works through market negotiations is a way to achieve economic efficiency
in the Coasean sense. 49 Where the copyright market fails to allow such bargains, fair
use may then facilitate non-consensual transfers of rights.5 0 Central to the system of
statutory copyright is the market that facilitates the establishment of legal relations
art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Wheaton, at 592.

40 U.S. CONST.
41

42 Id.

Id. at 660-61.
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 138 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1994) ("[The American culture of copyright centers on a
hard, utilitarian calculus that balances the needs of copyright producers against the needs of
copyright consumers, a calculus that appears to leave authors at the margins of its equation.")
43

44

[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY].
45 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant.., copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talent of authors.., in
'Science and the useful Arts."').
46 See generally Daniel A. Farber, ParodyLost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of
the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397 (1997) (accounting for the modern law and economics
tradition set by Ronald Coase).
47 See id. at 412-13.
48 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Robert Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright
Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1995).
49 See Farber, supra note 46, at 401.
50

Wendy J. Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure: A Structuraland Economic Analysis of the

Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1657 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair

Use].
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between copyright owner and the public to allow bargains for uses of works covered
by section 106.51 These legal relations between copyright owner and the public
embody perfectly Professor Grey's conception of property in the "modern capitalist
economy" as an intangible collection of rights within an "abstract institution," which
are not "rights of ownership" or "rights in things."5 2 There is no legal effect, at least
to legal realists, as to whether statutory rights are characterized as "property" for
they do not imply an in rem nature with respect to literary and artistic works. 53 For
the purposes of legal analysis therefore, statutory rights of an in personam nature,
attach to a person or legal entity-the author or copyright owner-rather than the
work, are enforceable against a single person or small number of identifiable
55
persons 54, and establish legal relations for consensual market bargains to occur.
Neoclassicism's emphasis on market rewards to provide the incentive for
authorial creativity, and developing copyright laws, which look to the market as the
best mechanism to efficiently allocate resources by putting creative works in the
hands of parties willing to pay the most for the work5 6 has three important
consequences on how parties within the copyright system-authors, publishers and
distributors, and society-relate to each other and with the creation, dissemination
and use of literary and artistic works. 57 Beyond the still unproven neoclassicist's
assumption that such economic incentives have a positive correlative effect on an
author's creative production,58 there are other effects of an over reliance on market
incentives to generate authorial creativity and productivity. The first effect of a
market-centric approach to the copyright system is that it projects authorship, which
may be understood as an expression of an author's individual experience and
personality, as a primarily economic-driven activity. 59 This causes the public to treat
works of authorship as a commercial commodity resulting in less respect for the
process of creative authorship when these works are used.6 0 Second, the market
based approach may have blurred the important distinction between property and
51See id. at 1602.

52Grey, supra note 28, at 69-71.
53Id.
54
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Propertyin Law and Economics
111 YALE L.J. 357, 360 (2001) ("[Plroperty rights attach to persons insofar as they have a particular
relationship to some thing and confer on those persons the right to exclude a large and indefinite
class of other persons ("the world") from the thing.... [Piroperty rights are different from in
personam rights ....[Which] attach to persons as persons and obtain against one or a small
number of other identified persons.").
55Gordon, FairUse, supra note 50, at 1612-13.
56 RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOES? 11-17 (2000).

57See Netanel, supra note 19, at 306-14.
58
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopiesand Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 351 (1970)
To demonstrate that an initial publisher's costs are high, while reproduction costs
are low, is not sufficient to establish the need for copyright protection. Rather, one
must examine other factors - the probable speed and ferocity of competitive
response, the presence of subsidies, the ability of buyers to channel revenue to
publishers and authors in the absence of protection - before it can be said that
copyright protection is needed.
Id.
59See Netanel, supra note 19, at 308-09.
60 See id. at 364.
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statutory rights and allowed copyright owners e.g. publishers, distributors, printers,
who may have financially invested in the production and public dissemination of the
work, but who have not been involved in its creative production, to assert exclusive
61
property-type rights in the expressive content of the work against the public.
Property rights in an author's creation define ownership rights in the work itself and
involve a unique right in rem to exclude.6 2 This right ought to be only asserted by
the creator of a work. Third, the market based approach establishes the commercial
market as a new patron of authors and artists, compelling creators of literary and
artistic works to produce works for the public, and to ensure that they are
remunerated for their works through the market, authors and artists may produce
works that appeal to the general masses at the expense of producing works of
authentic authorship, which, being a result of an author's or artist's expressive
individuality, may be of greater authorial or artistic value to the progress of science
63
and the useful art in society.
This paper examines the economic basis for the copyright system, and suggests
that a predominantly economic approach to the copyright system will result in a
bifurcated approach to thinking about authorial rights that ignores a more
fundamental tenet of property rights pertaining to an author's ownership in a work.
Neoclassicism's emphasis on market rewards as the appropriate mechanism to
generate authorial creativity and productivity is the perfect justification for
protecting entitlements in literary and artistic works: as markets change and
develop, so too should the entitlements copyright owners have over the uses of their
works. Neoclassicists argue that expanding private rights "into every corner where
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works" 64 will encourage the
production of a wide diversity of literary and artistic works to ultimately benefit
society. 65 On the other hand, copyright minimalists, while relying also on wealth
maximization and economic efficiency as the basis for their argument,66 criticize the
relentless expansion of copyright as an unhealthy impediment upon technological,
cultural and economic development.6 7 This second approach to thinking about rights
in literary and artistic works focuses on the grant of rights as an incentive for
creativity and productivity to serve the public. 6 8 Entitlements in literary and artistic

Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 456.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 30, at 789-91 (describing the nature of in rem rights).
63 Tyler Cowen & Alexander Tabarrok, An Economic Theory ofAvant-Garde and PopularArt,
or High and Low Culture, 67 S. ECON. J. 232, 241 (2000) (expressing concern over artists shifting
away from authentic expressions and contribution to the advancement of knowledge and towards
producing for market sales because of the potentially large earnings in the "superstar" market).
64 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 216.
65 See id. (stating that extending rights "into every corner where consumers derive value from
literary and artistic works .... [Will] promote political as well as cultural diversity, ensuring a
plenitude of voices, all with the chance to be heard."); Netanel, supra note 19, at 314-16.
66Netanel, supra note 19, at 308 (stating that both economic approaches to the copyright
system "purport[] to take wealth maximization and allocative efficiency as [their] organizing
principle").
67 Id.
at 294-96 ("[E]xpansion may ... pose[] the danger of chilling discourse and cultural
advancement .... [While] a broad, expanded copyright may, in effect, stifle transformative uses in a
way that parallels ... private censorship.").
68 Id. at 337-38.
61 See
62
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works, being secondary to the public interest,6 9 have to be calibrated against the
public value or social cost for the grant of the entitlement,70 an incredibly difficult, if
not impossible, task for law makers: how would we calibrate the exact extent of
entitlements to generate the necessary amount of creative works for society's
benefit? 71 Both neoclassicism and copyright minimalism regard the grant of
entitlements as a right to use the work in a particular way and accentuate the
"bundle of sticks" metaphor that deemphasizes the in rem nature of an author's
72
property right the work.
Part I of this article offers a more detailed analysis on the economic foundation
of the copyright system to show how law and economics jurisprudence has elevated
the importance of the copyright market as an incentive for authorship and creativity,
and in that process, undermined the notion that most forms of authorship of
significant cultural or educational value are products of an author's intrinsic, or
authentic, expression, which is seldom influenced by market rewards. Part II goes on
to suggest that recognizing an author's natural rights of ownership in literary and
artistic works will encourage authentic authorship by making author's morally
responsible for their creations. Natural law influence on the copyright system must
go beyond providing a basis to recognizing the author's rights in their creation
towards setting moral standards for authentic authorship and public uses of works.
As an increase in the storehouse of knowledge and information in society will
facilitate communicative discourses and provide raw materials to inspire other forms
of creativity, there is a need to ensure that rights do not inhibit access to works, and
in Part III, this article explains how the right to exclude, which follows the in rem
conception of the author's rights, can only be exercised by the author in situations
where his creative personhood is affected by a public use. Finally, in Part IV, this
article explores the legal implications of recognizing ownership rights of the author,
which are conceptually and legally distinct and separate from statutory rights under
section 106 in works, and calls for different legal treatments for ownership rights in
literary and artistic works and statutory entitlements to publicly disseminate the
work.

I. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

It was the eighteenth century poet and writer Samuel Johnson who said that
"[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money."73 Johnson's sentiment
69 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright
law... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
70Kreiss, supra note 48, at 8 ("The goals of encouraging the creation and dissemination of new
works require a carefully balanced set of rights given to authors and privileges granted to users of
copyrighted works.").
71Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 9, at 1066 ("[Ilt is hard-and perhaps even impossible-to
ever calibrate intellectual property law perfectly.").
72See HOHFELD, supra note 27, at 28-30 (discussing property rights as a collection of legal
interests); Netanel, supra note 19, at 306-14, 336-41 (discussing neoclassicism and copyright
minimalist theory); Merrill & Smith, supra note 30, at 789-91 (discussing in rem property rights).
73JAMES BOSWELL, II BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 14 (Henry Frowde ed., Oxford 1904) (1791)
(quoting Samuel Johnson).
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represents the predominant view that authorship is an economic driven activity. 74
Authors have to be paid for their creativity and productivity. One way to ensure that
literary and artistic works are produced would be to have patrons engage authors to
write: Shakespeare himself courted favors from patrons and wrote plays, which
would appeal to particular individuals. 75 Patronage, however, was regarded as being
"fatal to the integrity and independence of literary men" for they would then have to
look for "their daily bread to the favour of ministers and nobles."76 The ability to sell
their works on the market was thought to be the better form of remuneration for
authors. 77 That way, authorship will be free of the will of the author's patron and
literary and artistic production will "seek[] a broader, more varied consumer
audience" 78 thereby allowing the author to reach a broader audience for his work
through the market.7 9 The copyright market for literary and artistic works is
therefore the other way through which authors may be remunerated for their
creativity and productivity: authors sell their work to a reading audience, who pays
the author the market value for the work.8 0 Economic theory seeks to encourage
authorship by the promise of market rewards, and through the market, authors are
remunerated for their creativity. 8' Statutory rights ensure that market rewards are
appropriable. 8 2 Without the exclusive rights granted under section 106, authors and
their publishers will not be able to recover from society the market value for works,
which are non-exclusive and non-rival in consumption, and therefore susceptible to
free-riding by the public. 8 3 Although the greatest number of works may be
encouraged by market rewards from the sale of an author's work to his audiences,
which in turn contributes to the creation of diverse forms of literary and artistic
creations, it is uncertain if progress of the sciences and the useful arts may actually
be achieved through such creative diversity. Copyright markets may not necessarily
generate literary and artistic works of social, cultural, and educational utility, while
the recognition of rights under section 106 may not necessarily encourage authentic
authorship of significant value to scientific or artistic progress. 8 4 This part of the
article explores a possible alternative to the well understood meaning of scientific
and artistic progress, why copyright markets may not generate works that contribute
74See Netanel, supra note 19, at 308.
75 NORTHROP FRYE, NORTHROP FRYE ON SHAKESPEARE 10 (1986) ("Shakespeare seems to have

had the instincts of a born courtier: Macbeth, for example, would have been just right for James I,
who had come to London from Scotland a few years earlier.").
76 Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of Commons on the 5th of
February1841, in FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 310 (Foundation Press 2004).
77 Id.
78 Netanel, supra note 19, at 358.
79
Paul Goldstein, Copyright (Copyrightand Legislation: The Kastenmeier Years), 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 83 (1992) [hereinafter Goldstein, Copyrighd ("Patronage depresses authorship
by shutting the author off from the wider audience he might hope to reach.").
80 Macaulay, supranote 76, at 310.
81 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954) (stating that the copyright system is based on
the conviction that personal economic incentive is the best way to "advance public welfare through
the talents of authors").
82 See id.
83Lemley, FreeRiding,supra note 9, at 1041-42.
84 See Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 63, at 241 (stating that artists may shift away from
authentic expressions and contribution to the advancement of knowledge because of the potentially
large earnings in the "superstar" market).
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toward this meaning of progress, and how statutory rights under the copyright
system encourage the widest public dissemination of creative works but not the
process of authentic authorship.

A. Promotingthe Progress of Science and the Useful Arts
Congress grants statutory rights to authors for a limited duration in accordance
with its constitutional powers "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful
[a]rts."85
The promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts is,
fundamentally, the aim and purpose for granting exclusive rights in writings and
discoveries to authors.8 6 The temporary monopoly conferred by copyright laws
induces authors and artists to create and release their works to the public.8 7 An
author's genius and learning must be rewarded, even if society has to bear a cost for
the grant of that reward.8 8 The Constitutional clause providing Congress with this
power to ensure the progress of science and the useful arts allows laws to be passed
to secure for authors, for a limited duration, the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.8 9 This "intellectual property clause" 90 of the constitution
does not necessarily enable Congress to confer unlimited monopoly privileges that
are intended to only benefit the private interests of the copyright holder. 91 The
clause is rather intended to ultimately uphold the public's interest in access to the
fruits of authorial and artistic labor. 92 Ultimately, the grant of temporary private
rights benefits society by "promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts."93 To ensure that society reaps the benefit of authorial and
artistic labor, private monopoly rights under copyright laws are limited in scope, and
lasts only for a limited duration to ensure that the public are the ultimate beneficiary
of an author's works. 94 The statutory duration for protection limits the author's
exclusive rights, after which works fall into the public domain and become freely
available for society's use so that, in the words of Justice O'Connor, the "public will
95
not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors."
85 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.

8; 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (2006).

86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (quoting United States

v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
88 Macaulay, supra note 76, at 311 ("[Clopyright... is a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers.... [A]dmit[ing], however, the necessity of giving a bounty to genius and
learning. In order to give such a bounty, [Macaulay] willingly submit[s] to this severe and
burdensome tax.").
89U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
90
See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual PropertyClause: Promotion of Progress
as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1772 n.1 (2006)
(pointing out the inaccuracy of the term "intellectual property clause" despite the term's general
usage).
91U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).

93 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
94 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) ("[A]lthough dissemination of creative works is a
goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist's right to control the work
during the term of the copyright protection and the public's need for access to creative works.").
95 Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 429).
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The progress of science and the useful arts as a goal of the copyright system
justifies the monopoly power that copyright holders have over their works for the
duration of protection. 96 The cost on society while authors and their publishers own
exclusive rights to use and disseminate the work is high for the rights under
section 106 entitle copyright owners to dictate their terms upon which access to their
works may be given. 97 Copyright owners may choose to deny all forms of social
access to their work while copyright protection subsists in the work-the law allows
this-even though a right to exclude society from creative works can only exist when
ownership in the work can be established. 98 Chief Justice Hughes, in Fox Film v.
Doya, 99 alluded to the in rem nature of the right in literary and artistic creations
when he stated that "[t]he owner of the copyright, if he pleases, may refrain from
vending or licensing and content himself with simply exercising the right to exclude
others from using his property"'10 0 even though it must be pointed out that the right
to vend or license, granted under the copyright statute, is distinct from a general
right to exclude. The social costs of inaccessibility and negotiation for the use of the
work is high but it is a price that the copyright system is willing to bear to ensure the
production of creative works to benefit society-an inherently utilitarian philosophy
that some evils are tolerable to achieve the greatest good for the most number of
people. 1 1 In this same spirit, Sir Thomas Babington Macaulay acknowledged that
copyright "is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a [benefit] to writers" in a
speech before the House of Commons in 1841.102 He went on to say that this tax is
"an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of
human pleasures" but he conceded that there is a necessity to reward "genius and
learning" and to grant this reward, he was willing to "submit even to this severe and
10 3
burdensome tax."
The word "progress" in the intellectual property clause connotes an evolution or
development from the present status quo into a better, improved and more advanced
future. 0 4 The idea that scientific and artistic progress will be achieved in society's
best interest, by granting exclusive rights to authors for a limited time to encourage
the production of creative works, makes the social costs of monopoly rights in literary
and artistic works bearable: the means here would justify the ends. 105 Existing
96 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429-30.

97 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
98 17 U.S.C. § 106; Fox Film, 286 U.S. at 127.
99 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
100 Id. at 127.
101 See Peter J. King, UtilitarianJurisprudencein America: The Influence of Bentham and
Austin on American Legal Thought in the Nineteenth Century, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:

A GARLAND SERIES OF OUTSTANDING DISSERTATIONS 11-12 (Harold

Hyman et al. eds., 1986) (explaining that Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, for example,
thought that governments were a "vast evil" but were necessary to maximize the happiness of all
individuals, who collectively make up a society).
102 Macaulay, supra note 76, at 311.
103 Id.
104 See Oliar, supra note 90, at 1789 tbl.1, 1790-1807 (analyzing James Madison's suggested

use of the word "advancement" with Charles Pinckney's suggested use of the word "promotion" in
crafting the intellectual property clause).
105 See 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 1:3 (2008).
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Copyright-Patent Clause is
that it is the only clause in the original Constitution, other than the Preamble,
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literature on the idea of progress focuses on achieving progress by ensuring that the
beneficiaries of literary and artistic creations-society-has access to the author's
work. Professor Oliar, examining the records from the Constitutional Convention of
1787, emphasizes that the idea of progress was originally intended to be a
constitutional limitation on Congress's intellectual property powers: Congress may
only grant exclusive rights in literary and artistic works only if there is an
advancement of knowledge in society. 10 6 The judiciary, Professor Oliar proposes,
ought to take a proactive step to declare statutory enactments unconstitutional if the
10 7
cost to society outweighs the marginal benefits of a particular copyright law.
Society's progress justifying the grant of exclusive rights is therefore measured by
the benefits society receives from an author's creativity and the degree of public
accessibility to the knowledge contained in literary and artistic works.10 8 If society
has greater access to knowledge, society will grow into a better and improved
future. 10 9 To encourage the creation of as much literature and art as possible thereby
contributes towards this idea of progress, for knowledge is advanced through as
much works of authorship as may be encouraged through the grant of exclusive
rights to authors.10 In this light, Justice O'Connor's remark that "[c]opyright is
intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge" in Harper & Row
Pubhshers,Inc. v. Nation Enterprisesexemplifies this utilitarian ideal."'
The advancement of knowledge by encouraging authors to generate as much
creative works as possible by granting them exclusive rights will certainly contribute
towards a certain degree of social progress in the sciences and the useful arts. Most
works of authorship contain an immense reservoir of knowledge and information,
112
which may be used as building blocks for new forms of creativity and authorship.
Progress is definitely a result of innovative and creative uses of existing materials,
which is only made possible by ensuring a certain degree of public access to the
underlying ideas in creative works of authorship.1 3 A book on mathematical science
which states an ultimate goal to be served by its allocation of power; it begins by
providing the justification for such legislation as Congress may choose to

adopt ....
1d.
107

supra note 90, at 1810.
Id. at 1840-41.

108

See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 247-48 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

106Oliar,

109
Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea ofProgressin Copyright Law, 1 BUFF.

INTELL.

PROP. L.J. 3,

53 (2001) ("Access to existing work is a necessity. Access is required to enrich the future builders, so

that they will not have to reinvent the wheel. It is also required as the raw material for the new
knowledge."); Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining "Progress"inArticle
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution,or Introducingthe Progress Clause, 80 NEB.
L. REV. 754, 758 (2001) (arguing that progress means the dissemination of knowledge, rather than
qualitative improvement of the knowledge base); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress's Power to Promote
the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002) (disagreeing with
Pollack's conception of progress and stating that the phrase "to promote the [pirogress of' means "to
encourage" the advancement of the activity).

110 Pollack, supra note 109, at 758-60.

111471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
112 See Birnhack, supra note 109, at 45-46 (illustrating that virtually all works borrow from
previous works, analogizing the phenomenon to a builder adding bricks to existing bricks to create a

new structure).
113

Id.
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provides society with the knowledge on the methods of operation or diagrams
employed by the author so that future engineers, for example, may use them: the
reason for publishing a book is to "communicate to the world the useful knowledge
which it contains.""14 While those of us who think about copyright law consistently
look to legal institutions-laws and courts-to promote progress 115 , I would like to
suggest that progress is also a matter of ethical conduct on the part of authors, for as
much as progress is dependent on the quantity of work authors create, it is
dependent to a greater extent on the quality of work authors produce. The copyright
system has thus far rewarded all forms of creativity to promote progress. 116 In
Bleistein v. DonaldsonLithographingCo.,11 7 Justice Holmes affirms that any work of
commercial value to the public will be protected, even if the work, such as an
advertisement, lacks "aesthetic or educational value."118 It doesn't matter to the law
what kind of work is created-databases of information in the public domain, such as
a telephone directory, for example, are protected-as long as it is created with some
minimal degree of originality and creativity. 119 However, progress, arguably,
120
depends on the kinds of work authors write for the advancement of knowledge.
The improvement of society depends also on the type of literature and art, which
author's produce and make available to society. 121 What we read influences our lives
and who we eventually become. 122 We, as individuals, make up society. The literary
and artistic materials available for our use determine how we progress as a society.
It is entirely plausible that our use of the English language and understanding of
human nature today, as Professor Harold Bloom claims, is indeed attributable to the
playwright and poet William Shakespeare: literature has a profound way of swaying
society in ways, which may not be immediately apparent. 123 Harriet Beecher Stowe's
Uncle Tom's Cabin highlighted the immorality of slavery in the American south in a
novel that was impossible to ignore, and made the American Civil War an imminent
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA")
was challenged as being unconstitutional and Justice O'Connor, in giving the decision of the court,
also stated that "[t]he CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we
114 Baker
115 E.g,

cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain." Id. at 205.

116See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("To be sure, the
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of
works make the grade quite easily .
.
117 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
118 Id. at 252.
119Feist, 499 U.S. at 358 ("[Tihe originality requirement is not particularly
stringent.... [N]ovelty is not required. Originality requires only that the author make the selection
or arrangement independently.., and that it display some minimal level of creativity.").
120 See Marc K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist's Wrong Turn and the Scope of
Copyright Protection for FactualWorks, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 263, 280-84 (2006) (comparing
copyright protections for fictional and nonfictional works and discussing each's impacts on the

"advancement of knowledge").
121
122

See id.
See generally MADAME DE STAEL-HOLSTEIN, THE INFLUENCE OF LITERATURE UPON

SOCIETY (William Pearson & Co. 1835) (examining the historical influence of literature on ancient
and modern societies, and the reciprocal influence).
123 See HAROLD BLOOM, SHAKESPEARE:
THE INVENTION OF THE HUMAN 4 (1998)
("Personality ... is a Shakespearean invention, and is not only Shakespeare's greatest originality
but also the authentic cause of his perpetual pervasiveness.").
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certainty ending the horror of slavery and oppression of another human being. 124
Just as works of literature-fictional and non-fictional-and art may steer society
towards improvement and advancement in knowledge, literature and art may also
derail society from progress. 125 Pornography, works undermining our conceptions of
justice, liberty and freedom, or works inciting war, violence and hatred do not
advance knowledge or progress of the sciences and the useful arts-yet these works
are protected as literary and artistic works under the copyright system. 126 Unlike
the patent system until 1966,127 social or beneficial utility is not a prerequisite for
copyright protection. 128
The copyright market, I would like to suggest here,
facilitates the creation of works that may have little beneficial or social utility, and
may ultimately frustrate the intent of the Constitution to promote progress in the
sciences and arts to benefit society.

B. The CopyrightMarket
The set up of the copyright market encourages profit-driven forms of
authorship. 129 Judge Leval of the United States District Court for the Southern
124

HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN OR LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY (Modern
Library ed. 2001) (1852). In Jane Smiley's Introduction to Uncle Tom's Cabin she stated, "When
Abraham Lincoln met [Harriet Beecher Stowe] at the White House in 1862, he allegedly remarked:
'So, you're the little woman who wrote the book that started this great war!"' Id. at vi.
125 See, e.g., Tracy Reilly, The "SpiritualTemperature" of ContemporaryPopularMusic: An
Alternative to the Legal Regulation of Death-Metal and Gangsta-Rap Lyrics, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 335, 338-51, 392-97 (2009) (analyzing the history of popular music, its alleged detrimental
effects on society, and proposing that parents and educators are best equipped to protect children
from violent and obscene music).
126 Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1979)
("There is no other statutory language from which it can be inferred that Congress intended that
obscene materials could not be copyrighted. Moreover, there is good reason not to read an implied
exception for obscenity into the copyright statutes."); see Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their
pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use-if use
means to increase trade and to help make money. A picture is none the less a
picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used for an
advertisement. And if pictures may be used to advertise soap, or the theater, or
monthly magazines, as they are, they may be used to advertise a circus.
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
127 See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568), abrogatedby
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966).
[Tihe law requires.., that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to
the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word "useful" ... is
incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.... [A]
new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination, is not a patentable invention.
Id.
128 Burrow-Giles
Lithographing
Co.
v.
Sarony,
111
U.S.
53,
59
(1884)
("[P]atents ...cannot.., be issued to the inventor until the novelty, the utility, and the actual
discovery or invention... have been established by proof ....Our copyright system has no such
provision .. ").
129 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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District of New York, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., captured the
precise nature of the market when he stated that "[t]he copyright law celebrates the
profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of
knowledge.... The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of
science."'130 The copyright market provides the mechanism through which copyright
owners recover the cost of investing in the creation and production of creative works,
and obtain profits from the exploitation and commercialization of their works.' 3 ' The
market represents the author's audience and readers, from whom authors receive
remuneration for their creativity and productivity. 132 While the whole economic
philosophy of the copyright system is the creation of the market to remove authors
from ministerial, church or government patronage, and allow authors to write with
integrity and independence, 133 the same economic philosophy results in authors
writing for commercial profits from a new patron: the public. 134 The author's profits
from the sale of his work will be proportionate to the commercial value the public
places on a work, which in turn will produce an economic incentive for the author to
create works with the widest public appeal. 135 The statutory rights granted under
section 106 strengthen this economic incentive to authors further. 136 By providing
authors and copyright owners with exclusive control over uses of the work, the
commercial value of the work increases as works cease to be freely appropriable by
137
the public without the knowledge and consent of the author or copyright owner.
Creative works, which are non-exclusive and non-rival, may be distributed and
disseminated to the public through the market with the assurance of legal sanctions
being imposed upon those who use works without paying the necessary market value
of the work to the author or copyright owner. 138 Fundamentally, the grant of
section 106 rights to the author supports and sustains the copyright market as
Coasian negotiations and bargains are facilitated to shift entitlements to use literary
and artistic works to the party who values them the most, and who is willing to pay
139
the market price for it.
The copyright system, in accordance with the
constitutional goal to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, uses the

130802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
131See Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 173-74 (S.D. Cal. 1955)
("[T]he courts have taken a broad view of copyright protection in order to give the copyright
proprietor the exclusive right 'to any lawful use of his property whereby he may get a profit out of
it."' (quoting King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 536 (2d Cir 1944))).
132 See Macaulay, supra note 76, at 310.
133 See id.

134GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 4 ("[T]he marketplace will determine
whether a work has commercial value.... [J]f the work has commercial value, copyright's aim is to
put that value in the copyright owner's pocket.").
135See Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of CopyrightScope and
DoctrinalEff ciency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 194 (2006) ("[The author's hope of commercial success is
often what keeps them chained to the typewriter and keeps their publisher paying the rent.").
136 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
137 See id; 11 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT app. 66 (2009).
138 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 502, 504.
139 See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 50, at 1605-06.
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market to effectively transfer privately owned works to members of society willing to
0
pay the price to obtain access to use literary and artistic works.14
Copyright markets do not function perfectly all the time to allow for such market
transfers of rights to the party willing to pay the highest price for it. Markets fail
sometimes because transaction costs are insurmountable and there may be a lack of
information necessary for decision-making.' 4'
In such situations, Coasian
negotiations and bargains become impossible, and the fair use doctrine will apply to
142
effectuate socially desirable transfers that cannot be achieved through the market.
The fair use doctrine, a common-law judicially conceived doctrine establishes
limitations on the exercise of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner if the use of
a work without the permission of the author or copyright owner is justified based on
"the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish
the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work."'143 Section 107 of the
Copyright Act has given express statutory recognition to the doctrine and provides a
list of four factors that the courts may consider in any fair use analysis as an
affirmative defense to an infringement claim:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
44
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
The doctrine, "predicated on the author's implied consent to 'reasonable and
customary' use when he released his work for public consumption," 145 has an added
effect on authorship. As fair use is negated by the showing of potential harm to the
actual and derivative market, 146 there will be an incentive for authors to produce
works with the widest public appeal and commercial value, ascertained not only by
the value of originals but also of derivatives in the marketplace, to prevent public
uses of a work, which present a demonstrable harm to existing and future
markets. 147 Despite its nebulous legal contours and objectives, 148 and the fact that

140 See Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liabihty of Buletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 345, 393 (1993).

141 Gordon, FairUse, supra note
142Id. at 1614.
143 Folsom
144

50, at 1613.

v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).

145 Harper

& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985).

146Id.

at 568 ("[The fair use] inquiry must take account not only of harm to the original but
also of harm to the market for derivative works.").

147 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (stating that
commercial uses are presumptively unfair and noncommercial uses require proof of harm or adverse
effect on the potential market for the work and laying down the requirement of proof of some
meaningful likelihood of future harm to the potential market from the use of the work); see also
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (limiting Sony's statement to situations
where the use is an exact duplication-if the work serves as a market replacement, it is less likely to
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the four factors of section 107 are not exhaustive in a fair use consideration, 149 the
effect of a particular use on the potential market for the original work appears to be
highly determinative of the issue. 15 0 The reason for this is simple: if the overall goal
of the copyright system is to provide a reward to authors to encourage creativity, the
law on fair use should also protect the rewards that an author will derive from the
market, both actual and potential, for the original work to keep within the larger
goals of the copyright system. 151 Substantial harm to a derivative market, for
example, would weigh against the finding of fair use as one of the economic
152
incentives for the creation of original works is the ability to license derivates.
Using the creative expressions of authors "without paying the customary price" for
use of the work, as in the creation of The Harry Potter "Lexicon" from J.K. Rowling's
popular HarryPotterbook series, will not be considered fair use even if the creation
of the secondary material provide a substantial benefit to society: to find for fair use
15 3
in such a case would be to deprive authors of their incentive to create.
The development of the copyright market from the grant of rights under
section 106 and the application of the fair use principles under section 107 is an
be fair use; where the use of a work is transformative, market substitution is less likely but the use
will most probably be not a fair use if it affects a derivative market).
148 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1990)
("[N]either the decisions that have applied [the doctrine] for nearly 300 years, nor its eventual
statutory formulation, undertook to define or explain its contours or objectives.... Judges do not
share a consensus on the meaning of fair use."); cf Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair'sFair:A Comment on the
Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (1990) (commenting that Judge Leval's "analysis
supports allowing fair use when his criteria are met ... [i]t does not support restrictingfair use to
his criteria ..
").
149 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (listing four factors for consideration of the fair use defense, not
requisite elements) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 ("The factors
enumerated in the section are not meant to be exclusive .... ").
150 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 ("This last factor [the effect on the market] is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."); see also William W. Fisher III,
Reconstructingthe FairUse Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1669-1672 (1988). This article looks
at Justice Blackmun's and Justice O'Connor's broad conception of the "potential market" for the
original work in Sony, that the potential market is a "group [of persons] who would.., be willing to
pay to see" the work, and in Harper & Row, that "[tair use, when properly applied, is limited to
copying by others which does not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied"
respectively. Fisher III, supraat 1670-71 (quoting Sony Corp ofAm., 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) and Harper&Row, 471 U.S. at 566). The article also stated:
[J]n almost every case in which the fair use doctrine is invoked, there will be some
material adverse impact on a "potential market".
After all, in any such suit,
the defendant is seeking to use the plaintiffs copyrighted work in a fashion
ostensibly forbidden by section 106 of the Copyright Act ....
[T]he version of the
market-impact factor adopted in Harper& Row will almost always tilt in favor of
the plaintiff-and is therefore nearly useless in differentiating between fair and
unfair uses of copyrighted materials.
Fisher III, supra at 1671.
151 Leval, supra note 148, at 1110 ("[T]he function of fair use as integral to copyright's
objectives leads to a coherent and useful set of principles ....
[T]he use must be of a character that
serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public instruction without
excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.").
152 Campbel, 510 U.S. at 593 ("Evidence of substantial harm to [the derivative market] would
weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of derivatives is an important economic
incentive to the creation of originals." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(2))).
153 Warner Bros. Entm't v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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incredibly strong motivation for economic driven forms of authorship. While the
original work in itself may be commercially valuable, the primary market value in a
work is in the possible commercial exploitation of other forms of creative works that
are derived from the original. 54 The author alone is seldom capable, financially and
strategically, of marketing the work or transforming the original work into a
55
different artistic medium without the assistance of a publisher and financier.
Even if the author may have the financial capability and market connections to
market the work or transform the original into a new medium, he may lack business
acumen to manage the commercial exploitation of the work. 156 The rights under
section 106 provide the original author with the ability to transfer ownership of the
copyright to a party, which may be capable of bringing the work to the market. 157 At
the end of the day, the present copyright system is indeed about money. 58 Authors
assign or transfer their copyright in a work in return for royalties or payment of a
fee. 159 Songwriters assign their copyright in musical compositions to a musical
publisher in return for a royalty payment, musical publishers assign the right to
publicly perform the composition again for royalty payments of some sort, novelists
sell their derivative rights in literature to movie studios in return for the promise of
royalties from box office sales, and playwrights sell their plays to theatrical
producers for a fee.' 60 The copyright market exists to ensure that such transfers
occur to bring the work from the author to society and enables the copyright system
161
to fulfill its distributive goals: the market connects authors with their readers.
The copyright market, I would like to suggest here, is not necessarily conducive
towards authentic forms of authorship, which would contribute towards the
advancement of knowledge or the progress of society. Contrary to Macaulay's faith
that the copyright system will free men of letters from the patronage of ministers and
nobles, and encourage them to produce works of authorship with integrity and
independence, 162 the copyright market in itself is its own patron for authorship. 63
154 17 U.S.C. § 106; see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 474 (2003) ("[A] copyrighted work's derivative works may have

commercial value after the original work has lost it.").
155 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic Approach to Copyright
Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 254 (1996) (stating that the "print world"
only allows those wealthy enough to afford the costs of publishing a book to become "published
authors" while the digital environment allows for self-publication without such costs).
156 See id.
157

17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
supranote 44, at 4.
Michael B. Reddy, The DroitDe Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right

158 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY,
159

to a Resale Royalty, 15 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509, 532 (1995) (stating that most authors do not
exploit their work, but instead assign their rights to a company for publication in exchange for upfront money or royalties).
160

See id.

161

Goldstein, Copyright, supra note 79, at 80 ("It is copyright that makes it possible for

audiences-markets-to form for an author's work, and it is copyright that makes it possible for
publishers to bring these works to market.").
162 Macaulay, supra note 76, at 310.
163 See MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY
OF AESTHETICS 81-86 (Columbia Univ. Press 1994) (recounting Johann Christoph Friedrich
Schiller's shift from writing for royalty to writing for the public and noting that any fame and
economic reward was only derived from the types of work that the public demanded at that time).
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German playwright and philosopher Johann Christoph Friedrich Schiller referred to
the reading public as his "school, sovereign and [his] trusted friend" when he fled the
patronage of the Duke of Wtirttemberg and exalted the grandiosity of "appealing to
no other throne then the human spirit" as he began his career as a professional
writer. 164
The literary market, however, turned out to be indifferent and
unrewarding to Schiller's more authentic and intellectually-demanding philosophical
works on ethics, aesthetics and reason. 165 The fame and economic rewards Schiller
yearned from the public were only acquired to a certain extent by works that the
public demanded at that time, which were historical narratives half the merit of his
greater works-works written "with the greatest expense of spirit" but "rewarded
with aversion" by the public. 166 In 1792, Schiller accepted the patronage of the
Danish Duke of Augustenburg, who gave him the intellectual freedom necessary for
authentic authorship and Schiller, reflecting on his experience with the literary
marketplace, noted the irreconcilability of the demands of the market with the
demands of art. 167 "Utility," Schiller remarked, "is the great idol of our age, to which
all powers are in thrall and to which all talent must pay homage. Weighed in this
crude balance, the insubstantial merits of art scarce tip the scale, and bereft of all
encouragement, she shuns the noisy market-place of our century." 168 Contemporary
copyright markets may be equally unreceptive to literary and artistic works, which
do not conform to the expectations of popular culture or carry widespread appeal.
Justice Holmes in Bleistien v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. alluded to the aversion
the market may have towards works of authentic literary and artistic expressions
when he states that "some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation .... [U]ntil the public had learned the new language in which their
author spoke .... [T]he etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet" may not have
evoked the public's admiration "when seen for the first time." 169 Some authors
willingly surrender the economic rewards of the market place to engage in more
authentic pursuits of expression, 170 but unless an author decides to do so, the
copyright market is more likely than not going to produce works of authorship that

164

Id. at 41.

165Id.

at 81-82 (noting that Schiller tried to write for the public tastes in the hope of
introducing his readers to more demanding works once his reader base was established, but was
unsuccessful).
166Id. at 82-83.
167

Id. at 83-84.

168
169
170

Id. at 85-86.
188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 63, at 234. This article states that Beethoven, for example,
[Wirote his late string quartets to satisfy his creative urges, knowing the works
were too complex to satisfy a wide public audience at that time. Donatello and
Michaelangelo... would walk away from commissions if they could not determine
the content of the project. James Joyce chose a level of esoterica for his Finnegans
Wake that excluded most of the world's reader, even intellectually inclined ones.
Today, movie stars will sometimes accept a lower cut of the box office if they can
work on project of their own choosing. In a sample of over 1000 U.S. painters. 70%
reported rejecting on more than one occasion high-paying but artistically
unfulfilling commissions.
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conform to the demands of popular public tastes without contributing to the
171
advancement of knowledge or the progress of science and the useful arts.
Furthermore, the copyright market may not provide the strongest support for
the identified end of the copyright system as progress in the sciences and the useful
arts is not necessarily achieved by having a diverse amount of literary and artistic
works that are available to the public. The grant of statutory rights in literary and
artistic works that may be owned by a copyright owner, 172 who is not necessarily the
author or creator of the work, has resulted in a concentration of ownership rights in
the intermediaries who disseminate works of the author to his readersintermediaries whose primary interest in the work is purely commercial in nature. 73
Unlike the author, intermediaries do not undertake the individual creative labor and
personal expression an author necessarily does to bring a work to fruition and unlike
the reader, the intermediary is not as concerned with the contents of a work for
personal enjoyment, individual learning or inspiration and ideas for future
authorship and creativity. 74 For the intermediary, the primary interest in a work is
the amount of profits the work will reap from the marketplace. 75 Early English
copyright, besides being a method for Crown censorship of seditious and heretical
material, was, after all, a way in which London printers maintained control over the
book trade. 76 The exercise of exclusive monopoly rights by someone other than the
author or artist, who has not undertaken a process of authorial or artistic creativity
to produce the work, is likely to be driven by the intention to maximize profits from
the exploitation and commercialization of the work, especially when financial
77
investments have been made to reproduce and disseminate the work to the public.
The resulting effect of monopoly rights in the hands of intermediaries is the overcommoditization of works in an attempt to capture all social surpluses in creative
works. 7 8 While intended to facilitate dissemination of creative expressions of
individual authors and artist through the market to ultimately benefit the public and
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, the exclusive rights under
section 106 have a tendency to secure the position of intermediaries in a monopoly
171 Id.
at 241 (asserting that artists may shift away from authentic expressions and
contribution to the advancement of knowledge towards producing for market sales because of the
potentially large earnings in the "superstar" market).
172 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining "copyright owner" as "the owner of that particular
right" comprised in a copyright).
173 See W. Jonathan Cardi,
Uber-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music
Copyright, 92 IOwA L. REV. 835, 841 (2007) (explaining that among the many intermediaries in the
music copyright landscape are publishers that primarily act as royalty-collectors and bookkeepers,
performing rights organizations that license the right to perform copyrighted musical compositions,
and mechanical licensing organizations that license the right to physically reproduce the copyright
work).

174 See id.
175 See id.
176LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 114-15

(Vanderbilt Univ.

Press 1968) [hereinafter PATTERSON, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE].
177 See Cardi, supra note 173, at 841 (describing publishers as royalty-collectors and
bookkeepers).
178 See Lemley, FreeRiding,supra note 9, at 1037 ("The rise of property rhetoric in intellectual
property cases is accordingly closely identified not with common law property rules in general, but
with a particular view of property rights as the right to capture or internalize the full social value of
property.").
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position. 179 The present copyright system as an institution to promote progress is
heavily criticized in many respects, primarily because the laws, which are designed
to advance knowledge in society, do not achieve their ends satisfactorily. Academic
and scholarly communities, start-up businesses, social and cultural activists, and
technology developers note the chilling effect of the copyright market on innovation
and progress,18 0 and the ordinary lay person on the street will have difficulty
8
understanding the need to "clear rights" before using a copyrighted work.' '
Protecting private economic interests in literary and artistic works extensively under
a property-type regime will be a hindrance, rather than an impetus, to progress as
public access to creative works in all forms-including artwork, music, literature,
software programs, visual works, and research materials-become barred by the
exercise of private property-type rights of exclusion.18 2 As creative works become
sources of income and revenue for media businesses, these works come to be regarded
as business assets, rather than creative expressions, to which unrestricted public
access will cause depreciations in their commercial value and marketability. 8 3 As a
result of the conception of literary and artistic works as business assets, rather than
creative expressions, copyright owners are today inclined towards exercising
exclusive control over these works through law enforcement and technological
protection measures to the extent that public access to these works many times
84
becomes very difficult, if not impossible.
What if progress of the sciences and the useful arts however, means holding
authors to a higher standard of authorship and creativity, and encouraging authors
to undertake a moral responsibility towards the advancement of knowledge for
society?
What if we remove the economic lenses through which we have
conventionally looked through to understand the copyright system and market
theory, and replace them with fresh lenses of ethics and moral philosophy to
understand an institution with a goal of advancing knowledge in a completely
different light?
With an age-old philosophy to provide a novel vision for
contemporary analysis, will we eventually arrive at a different, more workable
solution to promoting the progress of science and the useful arts for society's benefit
today? I think we will. A more cohesive rights based system for authentic
179 See Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: Rethinking the
Collective Administration ofPerformingRights, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 541, 552 (2005) ("The
case of [performing rights organizations] ... fit[] into the paradigm of a natural monopoly.").
180Peter S. Menell, Envisioning CopyrightLaw's DigitalFuture, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 67
(2002) [hereinafter Menell, DigitalFuture] ("[Tihe intrusive and chilling effects of copyright's most
recent protections against digital piracy have aroused concerns about the freedom of technology
companies to innovate, the 'rights' of consumers to engage in fair use of protected works .... ").
181JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29 (Prometheus Books 2001) ("[C]opyright rules are
complicated and hard to understand.").
182 See Menell, DigitalFuture,supra note 180, at 67.
183Kenneth Cukier, A Market for Ideas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2005, at 1 ("In recent years
intellectual property has received a lot more attention because ideas and innovations have become
the most important resource, replacing land, energy and raw materials.").
184 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (2006) (making it a civil infringement and criminal offense to
circumvent copyright protection measures and to threaten the integrity of copyright management
information); LITMAN, supra note 181, at 143-44 (pointing out that with sections 1201-1204, it
becomes illegal to circumvent measures preventing unauthorized access to a work, which includes
using someone else's password to gain access to a subscribed publication or using software to view a
DVD that is regionally incompatible with the player).
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authorship is surely more conducive to the question of literary independence and
integrity than a system of ad hoc statutory rights and economic incentives, which
forces most authors to surrender their authentic expressions to public tastes in order
to receive remuneration for their works, and, which direct the production and
dissemination of literary and creative works towards segments of society willing to
pay the most for the work.185 While the market is important to provide a source of
remuneration to authors and creators, authorial and artistic integrity in a work of
authorship has a more significant bearing on how we progress, develop and improve
as a society. In the remainder of this article, I explain why a more comprehensive
system of authorial rights will move us in the direction of progress in the sciences
and the useful arts.

C. Author's Rights
Copyright jurisprudence gives limited recognition to the author's rights in his
literary and artistic creations and to the general concept of authorship.1 8 6 The
earliest copyright, which took the form of a right to print, did not conceive of any
special rights that the author had in the work. 187 The printer's guild, which
controlled the formation of early copyright, the Stationer's Company, would
occasionally grant authors the right to print their own works,18 8 but it wasn't until
Parliament's attempt to break-up the monopoly that the Stationer's Company had
over the book trade through the Statute of Anne 1710,189 that the author emerged as
an independent right holder in literary and artistic works. 190 Although the statute
gave the author legal standing with respect to their works, authors still wrote under
the auspices of patrons when the statute was passed. 191 The author began to break
185 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Rfght: Is an American Marriage
Possible 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 91-92 (1985) (advocating for personal, moral rights for creators which
would foster creativity but harm the economic interests of producers and publishers) [hereinafter

Kwall, Copyrightand the MoralRighft.

186 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright
law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
187 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 1:5 (West 2009).

188PATTERSON, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 176, at 64-66.
189

Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne. c. 19 (Gr. Brit.).

190PATTERSON, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 176, at 147.

Emphasis on the author in the Statute of Anne implying that the statutory
copyright was an author's copyright was more a matter of form than of substance.
The monopolies at which the statute was aimed were too long established to be
attacked without some basis for change. The most logical and natural basis for the
changes was the author.... [T]he author was used primarily as a weapon against
monopoly.

Id.
191DUSTIN GRIFFIN, LITERARY PATRONAGE IN ENGLAND 1650-1800 10 (Cambridge Univ. Press

1996).
The patronage system, as inherited from the Renaissance and strengthened
during the first part of the eighteenth century, operated in such a way as to
sustain the cultural authority of the traditional patron class ....
Despite the conventional view, there was no rapid or complete changeover
during the century from an aristocratic culture to a commercial culture, no
sudden change from a patronage economy to a literary marketplace.
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away from the patronage system and started looking towards the marketplace as a
source of recognition and reward for his literary and artistic efforts as an audience
emerged for his work years later. 192 Samuel Johnson's 1755 letter rebuking Lord
Chesterfield's extension of patronage for the Dictionary after Johnson had found
success in the marketplace and no longer needed any form of patronage 193 is deemed
the "Magna Carta of the modern author"'194 and signaled a change in times when the
"professional author" became "both economically feasible and socially acceptable."'195
The author's claim to rights in their creative works became more pronounced as
authors began to equate originality with the writer's own genius, thereby elevating
the writer as a mere craftsman "whose task is to utilize the tools of his craft for their
culturally determined ends" to an author, the genius who does "something utterly
196
new, unprecedented, or... produces something that never existed before."'
Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Compositions makes an early case for
conferring property rights on the author as one who "thinks and composes" while
others "only read and write,"'197 which Professor Martha Woodmansee hypothesizes,
provided German authors with the basis for asserting ownership in their literary and
artistic creations in the form of a copyright law. 98 The idea of the original author
who labors to produce a work was also eventually used by the Stationer's Company to
perpetuate their copyright monopoly after the Statute of Anne limited it to a
maximum duration of twenty-eight years. 199 Contemporary copyright scholarship on
the author has unfortunately painted the author as an inconsequential social
construct that was conceived as a result of changing market forces or "powerful
commercial interests, and political influence,"200 which developed with the
commercialization of literary and artistic works, 201and which very notion of the lone
Id.
192

See id.

193Letter from Samuel Johnson to Lord Chesterfield (Feb. 7, 1755) in 1 THE LIFE OF SAMUEL
JOHNSON, LL. D.: INCLUDING A JOURNAL OF HIS TOUR TO THE HEBRIDES 215-17 (Claxton, Remsen &

Haffelfinger 1868).
194

MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:

THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 4 (Harvard Univ.

Press 1993).
195 Id.
196WOODMANSEE,
197 Id.

supra note 163, at 37-39.

at 39.

198Id.

199See Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837, 846 (H.L) (appeal taken from Ch.); Millar
v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 203 (K.B.).
200 Oren Bracha, The Ideology ofAuthorstp Revisited."
Authors, Markets, and Liheral Values
in EarlyAmerican Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 270-71 (2008).
201 ROSE, supra note 194, at 1 (referring to the author as a "cultural formation" that is

"inseparable from the commodification of literature"); see Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of
Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 'Authorstp," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 459 (1991) ("Legal scholars'
failure to theorize copyright relates to their tendency to mythologize 'authorship,' leading them to
fail (or refuse) to recognize the foundational concept for what it is-a culturally, politically,
economically, and socially constructed category rather than a real or natural one."); Bracha, supra
note 200, at 267.
Is not authorship in modern copyright discourse merely a harmless declaratory
layer of rhetoric, a relic of bygone times that has little influence on 'real' copyright
law? After all, even a cursory look at copyright doctrine seems to confirm that
romantic authorship is just that .... [I]n "real" copyright law, originality is a
minimal requirement that has little to do with the romantic vision and that
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individual genius conflicts greatly with modern forms of collaborative authorship and
creative efforts.22 This deconstruction of the author, I would like to suggest here,
removes from copyright jurisprudence a natural entity, and not just a social
construct, who, if given more attention and scrutiny, will contribute immensely to the
end goals of the copyright system by advancing knowledge for the progress of science
and the useful arts.
Authors and artists play a significant role in the copyright system by engaging
in the process of authorship to create literary and artistic works for society.
Authorship may indeed take various forms and creative works may be produced in
solitude or through collaboration but one thing remains constant: the very first step
of bringing literary and artistic works to the public to promote progress in the
sciences and useful arts lies with the author or creator of a work. 20 3 Even works
20 4
produced by media conglomerates or works for hire begin with human creators.
Human creativity indeed lies at the heart of any copyright regime in both the
common and civil law author-based systems, 20 5 and cannot be dismissed without
removing from the institution of copyright law the central impetus for the
advancement of knowledge within society. 20 6 Professor Jane Ginsburg considers the
author the "human creator who, notwithstanding the constraints of her task,
20 7
succeeds in exercising minimal personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work."
The right that an author has to exert some artistic control over the work would stem
from the author's act of molding the work to the author's own vision 20 8 -an act of
individual authentic authorship, which coupled with a moral obligation to advance
knowledge in society, will contribute towards the progress of science and the useful
arts. 20 9 U.S. Copyright law has not, however, recognized, or rather may have
overlooked, the author's rights in their creations as legally and conceptually separate
and different from the economic rights granted generally to copyright owners under
"author" is a technical legal term that may mean some legal entity who is not the
actual creator.
Bracha, supra.
202 See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity,
10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (1992) ("[Tlhe persistence of the notion of 'authorship' in
American copyright law makes it difficult for any new legal synthesis, which would focus on the

reality of collective creativity, to emerge.").
203 See PATTERSON, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 176, at 70 ("The author ... is a
creator, and as such his work differs from that of others. First, his work is an extension of his
personality; second, his work constitutes contributions to the culture of society. Since his
contributions to society are unique and particularly valuable, it is to the interest of society to give

special protection to the author's personal interest in those contributions.").

204 E.g. Lewis Lazare, Has Chicago Lost Its Edge?. Fresh Talents Needed to Boost Local Ad
Agencies, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at 55 (reporting that Chicago's ad agencies need to hire the

best creative talents if they want to obtain "the most fascinating and effective work").
205

Jane Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative CopyrightLaw, 52 DEPAUL L.

REV. 1063, 1068 (2003) ("Much of copyright law in the United States and abroad makes sense only if

one recognizes the centrality of the author, the human creator of the work.").
206

207

See id. (placing human creation at the center of the institution of copyright law).
Id. at 1092.

208 See id. at 1068 ("Because copyright arises out of the act of creating a work, authors have
moral claims that neither corporate intermediaries nor consumer end-users can (straightfacedly)
assert.").
209

See id. (implying that moral rights is concurrent with copyright law which stems from the

Constitutional requirement of progress of sciences and the useful arts).
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the copyright act. The exclusive rights provided under the copyright act protect the
commercial value of the work, but recognizing the author's rights, will I think,
protect a different value in the work-the author's authentic artistic value and
individual contribution towards the advancement of knowledge in society. The
copyright system must not lose sight of the clear ethics of its legal institution-works
of genuine creativity must be encouraged before works of significant cultural, social
or educational value can be produced to contribute towards the advancement of
knowledge and the progress of the sciences and useful arts. While the market may
set a commercial value and be willing to pay a price for a work based on its appeal to
the masses, a work may damage the make-up of society by encouraging its departure
from social, ethical, and moral norms: Hitler's Mein Kampf for example, contained
the "unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed throughout its pages," and being
the "authentic source of Nazi doctrine" 2 10 led to the eventual Nazi regime of
aggression, genocide, destruction and social reconstruction. 211 The value of a work
for the purposes of progress of the sciences and the useful arts lies less in its market
or commercial value, and more on the authentic expression of the author that is
212
contained within to serve copyright's ends and goals.
Copyright law generally protects original works of authorship that are fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, which falls within one of these eight categories:
(1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) pantomimes and
choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures
and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works, 2 13
recognizes the author of a work as the initial owner of the statutory rights. 214 The
Berne Convention, which sets the minimum standard for copyright protection among
its signatory member states, sees the protection of the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works to be its primary concern, 215 but does not define who an
author is.216 The 1976 U.S. Copyright statute explicitly protects original works of
authorst but does not define who an author is in its definition section in 17 U.S.C.

210

Harold Leventhal et al.,
The Nuremhrg Verdict, 60 HARV. L.REV. 857, 864-65 (1947).

211

See id.

212

See Henderson v. Tomkins, 60 F. 758, 765 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894) ("Under the copyright side of

the statute, however, especially so far as it relates to dramatic compositions, what appeals to the
sense of curiosity, or excites wonder, is especially valuable, and therefore must be protected, or the
purpose of the statute would fail in a very large measure."); see also Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) ("Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something
irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction

in the words of the act.").
21317 U.S.C § 102 (2006).
214 Id. § 201.
215 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works pmbl., Sept. 9, 1886, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 ("The countries of the Union, being equally animated by the
desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works ....
").
216 See id. art. 2 (defining the subject matter of protection). This could be because there was
little doubt as to who an author is among the earliest signatories to the convention. See 1 SAM
RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE

BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 358 (2d ed. 2006).
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§ 101.217 The Copyright statute protects "copyright owners" as the owner of the
exclusive rights under section 106 but does not separate, nor distinguish, the rights
of the author as the creator of the work, from the rights of those who derive their
rights in the work from the author's collective bundle under the statute, such as the
publisher, printer or distributor of the work. 218 It is, however, important for the
development of copyright system to distinguish between those who produce works as
a creative expression of their individuality from those who undertake the task of
printing, publishing and distributing the work. While rights of the author may
generally be regarded as a property right in the work on principles of natural law
and original acquisition of property rights through creation, it is difficult to conceive
of the rights of financial and other non-authorial investors in a work, who undertake
the task of disseminating the work to the public, to be more than economic privileges,
or in personam rights, to perform certain actions with respect to the work: economic
privileges that arises from the copyright statute to encourage the performance of
specific tasks of bringing works to society in fulfillment of the intent of the copyright
system to promote progress are conceptually and substantially different from
property rights in literary and artistic works, which carry with them a general right
2 19
to exclude the rest of the world from the use of creative components in the work.
Some copyright scholars have argued that if the law were to recognize the author's
property right in the work, the right would be adequately justified on principles of
natural law and natural rights. 220 Although copyright minimalists suggest that
seeking to protect property rights of authors would lead to the over propertization of

217 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102; see also David Nimmer, Address, Copyrightin the DeadSea Scrolls:
Authorship and Originality,38 HouS. L REV., 1, 175 (2001) ("Just as early copyright statutes in the
United States provided no attempt to give definition to who constitutes and 'author,' the governing
act at present, passed in 1976, is similarly laconic.") [hereinafter Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead
Sea Scrolls].
218 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing that "the owner of copyright" has exclusive rights in
copyrighted works); see also Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, supra note 217, at 187
("[T]he editor or collaborator, with respect to her own contributions, still qualifies as an individual
author.").
219 See generallyWilliam Cornish, The Author as Risk-Sharer,26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2002)
(examining authors' moral rights and investors' rights under French and German law and
advocating for a similar distinction in common law countries). The interests of authors and the
interests of investors in creative works are different-authors are interested in the creative
component of the work while investors generally interested in the works market value. Id. at 1-3.
Copyright laws and producers' investment laws serve very different purposes and there is a need to
separate the rights of those who create the work from those who invest in the work. Id. at 11-13.
While copyright serves the purposes of benefitting creative authorship, producers' investment laws
protect
the economic investment in a work. Id.
220
See Wendy J. Gordon, A PropertyRight in Self-Expression: Equalityand Individualism in
the NaturalLaw of IntellectualProperty, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) ("[A] properly conceived
natural-rights theory of intellectual property would provide significant protection for free speech
interests.") [hereinafter Gordon, Self-Expression]; Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright
Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 891, 893 (2006) ("Locke's property philosophy guarantees
authorial rights, but it also acknowledges the collective role of the public in the creative process.").
See generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988)
(analyzing Locke's labor theory and Hagel's personality theory for property as the justification for
intellectual property).
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literary and artistic works, and the exclusion of society from uses of the work,221 I
would argue that the converse is true: the grant of property rights to authors in their
works will not only enable greater public access to creative works but will also
provide the copyright system with a moral and ethical foundation to encourage
authors to engage in authentic authorship to advance knowledge within society and
contribute towards scientific and artistic progress.
Professor Jane Ginsburg in her article, The Concept of Authorship in
Comparative CopyrightLaw, lays down six principles of authorship, which offers a
workable framework to acknowledge when an author's creative effort will amount to
authorship for the purposes of recognizing property rights in literary and artistic
works that are produced. 222 The first principle-that authorship places mind over
muscle-identifies the author as the one who conceptualizes the work and separates
him from the person executing directions to complete the work. 223 The person, who
invests in the creation of a work by providing financial and marketing support, such
as a publisher or distributor, should therefore not be entitled to exercise property
rights of exclusion in works-rights of an in rem nature-which stem from creative
expressions of authorship rather than financial investments or non-authorial type
contributions to the production of the work. The second principle is that the more
the author relies on a machine, for example a camera or a computer, to produce the
work, the more an author must demonstrate that he, rather than the machine,
produced the work. 224 The third principle equates originality with authorship
225
although the standard for what amounts to originality differs from case to case.
Both these principles identify a requirement that the author, in order for the work to
be a work of creative authorship, be original in the creation of the work. 226 This calls
for a review of original authorship as a legal standard for the initial recognition of
property rights in literary and artistic works, and this paper suggest that there may
be a need to assess creativity and original expressions of authorship on a higher
standard than the present legal standard of minimal creativity to justify the grant of
property rights in the work of an in rem nature to the author. The fourth principle is

221 Eg,
James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright Spleens, Blackmail and
Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1468 (1992) ("[R]omantic vision of authorship ... provided
the necessary raw material to fashion some convincing mediation of the tension between the
imagery of public and private in information production."); Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of
Mickey Mouse: Expanding Boundariesof IntellectualPropertyLaw, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2004)
("Because intellectual authorship is intrinsically exceptional ... [the] romantic conception of
authorship carries with it a normative command for stronger protection of intellectual work."); Mark
A. Lemley, Book Review, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873,
885 (1997) ("Intellectual property protection encourages authors to invest time and effort in the
creation of new works of authorship, but taken to an extreme, such protection can make the creation
of new works virtually impossible by locking up all of the possible sources from which a new author
can work.").
222 Ginsburg, supra note 205, at 1072-91.
223 Id.
224

at 1072.
Id. at 1074-77.

225 Id. at 1078-82; see Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348, 358 (1991)
(holding that a collection and arrangement of facts in an original way would qualify the compiler as
an author). Hence there is a minimum amount of originality and creativity required for a work to be
a work of authorship. Feist,499 U.S. at 348, 358.
226 Ginsburg, supra note 205, at 1074-78.
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that skilled reproductions of more than negligible level are works of authorship. 227
The fifth principle requires intent on the part of the creator of the work to be
regarded as the author, which may become more of an issue when there is contention
of authorship status in a collaboratively produced work by one or more collaborator
seeking the status of an author. 228 The sixth principle is that the commissioner of a
work made for hire is also the author 229 although one would be extremely skeptical
about the status of authorship with respect to the commissioner of a work. 230 The
commissioner has not invested in creative authorship and cannot be given the right
of the author who created the work: one is either the creator of a work, or one is
not. 231 The last three principles address forms of authorship, which may not fit the
traditional romantic model of the autonomous author, who creates an individual
work of authentic authorship based solely on individual experience and personality,
but introduces a conception of authorship that is largely collaborative and
interdependent. 232 Collaborative works are also works of authorship, but requires
the identification of the author or authors, who may individually and collectively
exercise property rights in literary and artistic works. 233

II. NATURAL LAW INFLUENCES IN THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
Natural law influences in the copyright system have concentrated on the rights
of an author in relation to his literary creation. Two theories of property rights in the
natural law tradition have frequently been advanced to support property rights in
works for authors-John Locke's labor theory that the author who mixes labor with
what nature has provided acquires property in what is produced and Friedrich
Hagel's personality theory that creative works should be protected as the property of
the author because the work manifests the author's personality. 234 Both labor and
personality theories, I think, provide adequate justification for recognizing property
227
228

Id. at 1082-85.
Id. at 1085-88.
Intent... does not make a contributor more or less creative, but it may

supply a means to sort out the equities of ownership in cases in which more than
one contender is vying for authorship status. There, the problem is not so much
whether the contenders intended to be creative, as whether they intended to share
the spoils of creativity, that is, whether they intended to be joint owners of the
copyright.
Id. at 1087.
229 Id. at 1088-92.
230 See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("As a general rule,
the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into
a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.").
231 Ginsburg, supra note 205, at 1091 ("[Slhould we maintain that vesting authorship in
employers for hire is an aberration whose aspirations to the copyright mainstream we should resist
lest copyright lose both its humanist cast and the moral appeal that flows therefrom?").
232 Id. at 1082-91.
233 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a) (2006); see, e.g., Janky v. Lake County Convention & Visitors
Bureau, Nos. 07-2350, 07-2762, 08-1606, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17207, at *11-12 (7th Cir. Aug. 3,
2009) (discussing co-ownership).
234 Hughes, supra note 220, at 297-300, 330-32 (discussing Lockean theory and Hegelian
theory).
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rights of authors in their literary and artistic works that are larger and more
encompassing than the statutory rights provided for under section 106. Property
rights in the natural law tradition represent a standard of morality that may not be
necessarily captured and reflected in a statutory enactment adequately. 235 By
recognizing natural rights of authors, the copyright system conforms to a larger
ethics of promoting the progress of sciences and the useful arts through the works of
authors. 236 It was a brilliant law professor who had once said that "t]here are many
different types of relation between law and morals and there is nothing which can be
profitably singled out for study as the relation between them" 237 and it is with great
trepidation that I venture to suggest otherwise for the copyright system-for a legal
system intended to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and advance
knowledge for society cannot be property understood without an understanding of a
larger ethics of author's rights and authentic authorship. 238 The single relation
between jurisprudence and ethics, or law and morals, in copyright lie in the rights
and obligations, which authors, as the creator of literary and artistic works, and
society, as the user of those works, have towards each other in the tradition of a
hypothetical social contract to "accept certain moral principles" 239 with respect to the
kind of literary and artistic works authors create for society, and the manner in
240
which society uses these works for social, educational and cultural growth.

A. NaturalLaw, Legal Positivism and the Copyright Tradition
Since the decision of Wheaton v. Peters,2 41 rights under the copyright system
have been a matter of positive laws, provided for by statutory provisions under the
federal Copyright Act. The courts have generally accepted the proposition in
Wheaton v.Peters that the only rights under the copyright system are the exclusive
rights that had been newly created by Congress in the Copyright Act, 2 4 2 and have
deferred to Congress in deciding matters of copyright policy that would set the
appropriate balance of interests between copyright owners and the public. 243 In
Eldred v. Asheroft, the United States Supreme Court refrained from second-guessing
Congress's decision to expand the scope of copyright protection from fifty to seventy
years after the life of the author under the Copyright Term Extension Act 1998.244
Justice Ginsburg, in delivering the decision of the Court, stated that when it comes to
the implementation of the constitutional aim of promoting progress, Congress's
policies, whether good or bad, if not within the purview of the courts for the "wisdom

235 Ng,Social Contract,supra note 25, at 419; see Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 220, at
1541 (discussing moral duties under natural law theory).
236 See Kwall, Copyrightand the MoralRight, supra note 185, at 91-92.
237 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185 (Clarendon Press 1994).
238Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 419.
239 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 16 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
240 Ng,Social Contract,supra note 25, at 457.
241 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
242 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
243 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2002).
244 537 U.S. 186, 186, 222 (2002).
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of Congress' action ...is not within [the Court's] province to second-guess." 245 The
court's consistent deference to Congressional powers in setting the proper policies for
promoting the progress of sciences and the useful arts may have entrenched the view
that rights in literary and artistic works are essentially statutory rights based on
positive law and that there are no other rights outside the Copyright Act, which an
author could possess by virtue of his creating the work. 246 Justice Steven's
observation in Sony that "It]he judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections
afforded by the copyright without expressive legislative guidance is a recurring
theme" 247 best summarizes the reluctance of the courts to look at the rights of
authors as being a larger and more cohesive whole than the present bundle of rights
248
provided for under the statute.
An author's rights however, cannot be limited solely to the exclusive rights to
use the work in the particular ways laid out in section 106. The rights of the creator
of a work should be greater than the right to make copies or derivatives, or distribute
or publicly perform or display the work. 249 The creator of a work owns the work in a
way that excludes everyone else. 250 The metaphor of paternity used in the sixteenth
and seventeenth century to describe the relationship between the author and his
work as that of parent and child is a helpful figure in conceptualizing the rights of
the author in relation to the work: there is only one creator who could have, like a
parent, naturally begotten the work, and regardless of how the law later defines the
owner of the work to be, the author of the work remains its creator. 25 1 Locke's and
Hagel's theories, both in the natural law tradition, provide a convincing argument
that literary and artistic works should be protected as the author's property. 25 2 An
author who labors and uses works in the public domain to bring a new work to
fruition deserves to own the work as his property. 25 3 Likewise, an author who pours
his authentic expressions into a literary and artistic work would have extended part
of his personality and ought to be entitled to property in the work protected as a form
of natural right.254 A critical examination of the historical trajectory of copyright
law, the development of the notion of the romantic author, and the requirement of
originality in creation of the work reveals that authors have had separate and
distinct roles from that of the publisher, printer or distributor in the copyright
system. 255 The individual rights of authors appear to have, by historical evidence,
Id. at 222.
See id.
247 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
248 See Jessica Litman, LawfulPersona] Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1883-89 (2007) (discussing
Sony and other relevant case law and stating that "[wihere expansive constructions of statutory
rights would have meaningfully constricted historic copyright liberties, these courts refused to
interpret rights so broadly.").
249 Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 424-25 (advocating a natural rights based copyright
system instead of the current utilitarianism based system).
250 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 201(a) (2006).
251 See ROSE, supranote 194, at 38.
252 Hughes, supra note 220, at 297-300, 331-32 (discussing Lockean theory and Hegelian
245

246

theory).

See id. at 297-300 (discussing Lockean property theory).
See id. at 331-32 (discussing Hegelian property theory).
255 PATTERSON, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE supra note 176, at 77 (asserting that English
printers appeared to have recognized a property right and a creative right, which authors possess);
253

254
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existed independently from the utilitarian goals and aims, and economic policies, of
the copyright statute, and if conceived as a matter of natural law, authors would
have ownership of the work, and not just ownership of section 106 rights to conduct
particular actions with respect the work, but the recognition of natural right of
authors would also imply moral obligations and ethical duties owed by authors to the
public in what they have created and produced: the inclination towards progress of
the sciences and the useful arts and the advancement of knowledge in society as a
natural order would require the recognition of natural rights and obligations on both
the author and his audience.25 6 As the progress of science and the useful arts, and
the advancement of knowledge, is dependent on the type of works authors create,
authors are therefore under a moral or ethical obligation to society to produce and
2 57
create works that will further the common good of society, and promote progress.
The acknowledgement of authorial rights over literary and artistic works premised
on theories of natural law and natural rights therefore recognize both property rights
that authors have over the works by virtue of their creative authorship and the
rights society have to use those works for development and growth.2 58 However, the
analysis of authorial and societal rights in literary and artistic works cannot end
with the acknowledgement that such rights may be founded on Locke's and Hagel's
rights theories because in practical legal terms, these rights must be acknowledged
and protected under a system of laws.

note 194, at 20 (offering sixteenth and seventeenth century examples of courts
upholding the authors rights in his work); WOODMANSEE, supra note 163, at 51-52 (stating that
ROSE, supra

German authors would also claim ownership of their authorship-the creative form taken by the
work-and the German copyright laws, Urheberrecht, protected the author as the creator or
originator of the work allowing the publisher to function as the author's agent in the eighteenth
century); see also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
OF USERS' RIGHTS 73 (1991).
The failure to articulate the distinction between the work and the copyright
has proved to be the major flaw in nineteenth-century copyright
jurisprudence.... After the grant of statutory rights was enlarged in the 1909
[United States Copyright] act, the distinction between the work and the copyright
receded into the background.
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra.
256 See Ng, Social Contract supranote 25, at 424-25 (encouraging a copyright system based on
natural law which is divergent from the current utilitarian, economic based system). Burdens and
obligations placed under classical natural law cannot be done in an "unequal fashion even if they are
aimed at the common good." ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS
55 (Paul E. Sigmund ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1988).
257 Ng, Social Contract, supra note 25, at 464 ("By protecting the moral rights of authors,
copyright law ensures that an author's personal integrity remains intact after the creation is made
available to the public and this, as a result, encourages the kind of authentic authorship that
contributes to the pursuit of excellence within society.").
258 See Gordon, Self-Exprssion, supra note 220, at 1535 (arguing that a natural rights theory
can protect both the interests of authors and the public).
Natural rights theory ... is necessarily concerned with the rights of the public as
well as with the rights of those whose labors create intellectual products. When
the limitations in natural law's premises are taken seriously, natural rights not
only cease to be a weapon against free expression; they also become a source of
affirmative protection for free speech interests.
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As the ethical and moral dimension of the copyright system is wider and more
encompassing than the statutory rights of the Copyright Act, the common law would
be the best guardian of social conduct on the part of the author and his readers as to
what kinds of acts would contribute to progress and the advancement of knowledge.
State common-law rights of the author, which protected pre-published works,25 9 have
been abolished by the 1976 Copyright Act, which protects works of authorship as
soon as it is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 26 0 thereby eliminating the
distinction between published and pre-published works26 1 and common-law and
statutory rights. 26 2 The significance of this is immense. The statutory rights
represent a bundle of rights of an in personam nature, which allow the copyright
owner to do certain things with respect to the work but do not convey a more general
sense of property of the in rem type to which a general right of the author to exclude
the rest of the world would attach to.26 3 Professor Lyman Patterson points out that
the author may transfer any of the rights under section 106 because they are
divisible but that such a transfer, while conveying "title to the copyright does not
constitute transfer of title to the work ....
[T]he 1976 Act ... does not deal with the
ownership of the work, only with ownership of the copyright."26 4 The "key
difference," as Professor Patterson highlights, is "that common-law copyright is no
longer available to vest ownership of the work in the author."2 6 5 The key question
now is therefore whether property rights in creative works may be vested in the
author without the common-law copyright under a more general natural law theory
of property or moral rights in literary and artistic creations. The answer would be an
affirmative yes, if we are willing to consider the recognition of the author's rights in
literary and artistic works as a moral judgment made about the process of authorship
and the resulting work, which is created as necessary to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts within a larger more cohesive ethical framework for the
copyright system. The premise of natural law is this: that there are certain
fundamental truths about human nature and human needs that are accessible to
each one of us as rational beings. 266 One of the truths in natural law is that all men
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214 (1999).
Under the regime created by the 1909 Act, an author received state common
law protection automatically at the time of creation of a work. This state common
law protection persisted until the moment of a general publication. When a
general publication occurred, the author either forfeited his work to the public
domain, or, if he had therebefore complied with federal statutory requirements,
converted his common-law copyright into a federal statutory copyright.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
260 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2006).
261 Id.; Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 244 N.E.2d 250, 254 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1968)
("Common law copyright [before the 1976 Act protected] an author's proprietary interest in his
literary and artistic creations before they have been made generally available to the public. It
enables the author to exercise control over the first publication of his work or to prevent publication
entirely.").
262 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
263 L. Ray Patterson & Christopher M. Thomas, Personal Use in Copyright Law:
An
Unrecognized ConstitutionalRight, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 475, 517 (2003).
264 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 255, at 120-21.
259

265

Id. at 121.

266 AQUINAS, supra note 256, at 50 ("[J]t is evident that as to the general principles of
reason.., there is a single standard of truth and right for everyone which is known by everyone.").
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ought to seek knowledge as a desired end as a moral obligation 26 7 offers an ethical
basis upon which property rights may be separated from economic incentives and
from which an author's rights may be predicated. Property rights of an author in
works of authentic authorship affirms an author's genuine contribution to progress
and the advancement of knowledge through literary and artistic works, and removes
authors from the patronage of the copyright marketplace by encouraging authentic
expressions. Property rights of an author in his creations, which is founded on a
philosophy of natural law expresses the ethical view that the moral content of a work
is more important than the commercial value of the work on the market. In the same
spirit that St. Augustine had when he declared that "an unjust law is no law at
all," 26 8 it may be asserted that a work that is devoid of authentic content to promote
progress or advance knowledge is not a work of authorship nor is its creator an
author. An author has a moral obligation to society to promote progress or advance
knowledge through their works even when society believes that they have a right to
26 9
dangerous, indecent or immoral works.

B. A uthentic A uthorship
The phrase "authentic authorship" here refers to the process of authorship and
creativity, which represents more than an author's labor and personality poured out
into the production and creation of a literary and artistic work. It is taken to connote
the right of the author to have the law acknowledge authentic expressions that
manifests his individual creativity where the author produces a work that makes a
genuine contribution towards the advancement of knowledge and the improvement of
society by promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, but it also suggests
of a moral obligation on the part of the author to produce works for society with those
ends in mind.
Authentic authorship, while it will definitely include works
270
it is
representing the intrinsic dimension of the artistic soul in the spiritual sense,
not necessarily so confined. Authentic authorship also does not confine itself to the
romantic notion of the individual genius creating in isolation, although it would
include it, for it is well accepted today that authors create using existing works of
authorship and are often inspired by works of other authors. 271 By "authentic
authorship," I mean a unique contribution of a unique human experience made by
the author on his part to the general pool of knowledge and information available to
the public to provide society with literary and artistic materials that will encourage
social, cultural and educational growth. Works of authentic authorship are generally
not created for the market, a patron, or for government subsidies. 272 They are the
26

7 Mortimer Adler & Bill Moyers, A Dialogue on the Nature of Goodness, in AQUINAS, supra

note 256, at 193-96.
268 SAINT AUGUSTINE (BISHOP OF HIPPO), ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL bk. 1, 8 (Thomas
Williams trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993).
269 See Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 467.
270 For an excellent account of the relationship between spirituality and artistic innovation, see
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspirationand Innovation: The IntrinsicDimension of the Artistic Soul,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945 (2006).
271 Jessica Litman, The PublicDomain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966-67 (1990).
272 See Ng, Social Contract supra note 25, at 426.
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individual expressions of authors written to convey useful information, thoughts,
ideas or simple musings to benefit, and not harm, society. 273 The individual author is
in a "unique position as the creator and producer of literary and artistic works in the
center of the copyright legal system comprising other authors, readers and the
publisher/distributor:" he produces a work that can either improve or adversely
affect, and in extreme situations destroy, the fabric of society. 274 "Before a work is
put before the public, an author must conceive of a work and engage in an intricate
process of creativity to produce the work."275 An ethics for the copyright system must
encourage this form of authentic authorship in art, music and literature to avoid
authorial creativity from being determined solely by popular demand on the
commercial market. 276 The idea of authentic authorship does not guarantee the
creation of works that will only further the interests of society. 277 Works detrimental
to society's interest may still be created but the idea of authentic authorship provides
a benchmark to assist us in deciding whether the work is a work of authorship.
Seditious materials may do more harm than benefit to society and may properly be
regarded as not being works of authorship to which its writer is entitled to a property
right.
In the case of Stanley v. Georgia, an appellant was convicted of private
possession of obscene matter. 278 The appellant appealed, contending that state law,
which made the private possession of obscene materials illegal, violated the First
Amendment and was unconstitutional as a result. 279 Justice Marshall in delivering
the decision of the United States Supreme Court 28 0 held that the appellant's "right to
be let alone ... to read or observe what he pleases ... to satisfy his intellectual and
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home"281 without Government interference
was unquestionable. 282 "If the First Amendment means anything," Justice Marshall
goes on to say, "it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men's minds."28 3 Furthermore, to Justice Marshall, the assertion that
exposure to pornography would lead to deviant social behavior was an insufficient
284
reason for the State to interfere with the private possession of such materials.
Commenting that "the State may no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter
on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession
of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits."285 Justice Marshall clearly set a bright line rule that prevented

274

See id.
Id. at 428.

275

Id.

276

See Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 63, at 241.

277

See Ng, Social Contract supra note 25, at 435.
394 U.S. 557, 558 (1969).

278

278

Id.
Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
279

280

at 559.
at 558.
at 564-65.
at 565.

283
284

Id.

285

Id. at 567.

Id. at 566-67.
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states from interfering with the private individual's choice of reading material. 286
While states and governments are generally restricted in what they may do with
respect society's use of such materials in the privacy of their own homes, save for
situations where the rights of the public is affected by such use,2 8 7 the
acknowledgement of an author's moral obligation towards society by being authentic
in their creative works of authorship provides the copyright system with a moral
compass to make value judgment on the type of literary and artistic works that ought
to be created for society and the type of literary and artistic works society ought to
read or use for the advancement of knowledge or progress in education, culture or art
without requiring government interference with the kinds of works that are produced
and used.

C. SocialAccess to Creative Works
As most authors generally use works from the public domain and existing works
of authorship to create new works of their own, the idea of authentic authorship does
not allow an author to preclude reasonable social access to use of the work. The law's
encouragement of authentic authorship will facilitate greater social access to an
author's work for an author, who borrows from others to produce new works, by
natural order and natural law, ought to make his work equally available to the
public, and other authors, for use.2 8 8
Existing doctrines within the copyright
system-the idea/expression dichotomy, merger doctrine and fair use-aim to make
creative works more accessible to the public to aid in the creation of new works of
authorship.28 9 It was Judge Hand who had remarked that the basic personality
traits of the characters in Shakespeare's plays were ideas that were "as little capable
of monopoly as Einstein's Doctrine of Relativity, or Darwin's theory of the Origin of
Species."2 9 0 Within the framework of the copyright system, access to ideas for public
use is a matter of right: section 102(b) of the Copyright Act states that copyright
protection does not extend to any idea, "regardless of the form in which it is
29 1
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
However, the notion that authentic authorship ought to be protected as a matter
of morality would also recognize a natural right that men generally have to pursue
knowledge. 292
Acknowledging a natural right to knowledge2 93 would mean
286

Id.

Breard v. City of Alexandria, LA., 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951) ("The police power of a state
extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional
limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community." (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949)), abrogatedby Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444
U.S. 620, 631-33 (1980).
288 See Ng, Social Contract supra note 25, at 426.
289 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107 (2006).
See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(idea/expression dichotomy and merger doctrine); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nat'l Enters.,
471 U.S. 539 (1989) (fair use); see also R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1144
(10th Cir. 2009) (applying the merger doctrine).
290 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1930).
291 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
292 AQUINAS, supranote 256, at 192-96.
293 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-80 (1980).
287
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recognizing that society has a right to have knowledge that would promote progress
conveyed to them for use in research, education, development and learning. This
right would therefore correspond with the author's moral obligation to produce works
of authorship that would fulfill this purpose. 294 Conversely, the public, in accessing
works of authorship, must respect the author's property right in the work-the right
to generally exclude society from uses of the work that contradicts his purpose for
creating the work-and would be under a moral obligation to the author to use the
work in a way that will further the goals of the copyright system. Using a chemistry
book to manufacture homemade spirits to cause public harm, 295 or the looking to the
Bible to justify a war, would be a breach of the moral obligation society has towards
the author of a work. While the obligation society has towards the author of a work
of authentic authorship would be similar to a respect for an author's moral rights
within the European tradition, the moral obligation here pertains more specifically to
uses of a work, which departs from the general purposes of promoting the progress of
science and the useful arts within society. 296 The work may not necessarily be used
in a derogatory or offensive manner to offend the author's paternity or integrity
moral right but may be used in a way that departs from the general purposes of
advancing knowledge. 297 If that occurs, the moral obligation towards the author is
breached.

III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Protecting the author's rights in literary and artistic works therefore highlights
the issue discussed in the earlier part of this paper-that there is a need to separate
property rights in literary and artistic works that authors have by virtue of their
creative endeavors, and economic incentives to disseminate the work to the public to
fulfill the constitutional mandate. 298 The reason for such a distinction between
property rights and economic incentives is that both serve essentially different
purposes with respect to the public's interest in having literary and artistic works to
promote progress. 299 Property rights in literary and artistic works are premised on
the idea that authors have a natural right in their creations because they created
it.300 They are connected to the work in a way that is unique and different from the
publisher or distributor of the work. Recognizing the author's natural property right
in the work will facilitate greater authorial confidence to create works that are
authentic expressions of their individuality, and allow authors the right to the
exclusive use of their property, subject to the moral obligation to make their work
294

See Ng, Social Contract supra note 25, at 466-67. But see FINNIS, supra note 293, at 65

("This is not to say that everyone actually does recognize the value of knowledge, or that there are
no pre-conditions for recognizing that value. The principle that truth (and knowledge) is worth
pursuing is not somehow innate, inscribed on the mind at birth.").
295 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969).
296 See C. PROP. INTELL. art. L121-1 to L121-9 (Fr.).
297 See id. art. L121-L122.
298 See Cornish, supranote 223, at 11-13.
299 See Glen Pudelka & Etienne Kairis, A Fair Use of Harry?A United States vs. European
Perspectiveof CopyrightLaw, 21 INTELL. PROP. J. 379, 384 (2009) (Can.).
300 See Hughes, supranote 220, at 297-300, 331-32.
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available to society to promote the progress of science and the useful arts and
advance knowledge. 3° 1
Economic incentives, which arise through statutory
provisions, facilitate the dissemination of works over the copyright market by
creating legal barriers to uses of the work to prevent non-paying members of society
from free-riding upon the effort of its creator. 30 2 Central to this distinction between
property rights and economic incentives in the copyright system is the conceptual
and legal differences between two natures of legal rights-the right that is good
against the world, and the right that is good only against particularly identified
individuals or entities-which must inform our analysis of the author's property
rights in literary and artistic works. 303
Legal systems generally have two modalities of rights to regulate the use of
resources differently-the right in personam identifies the specific rights to use
resources between specific individuals and the right in rem identifies a particular
resource (the thing to be protected) and the person (the owner of the thing), who acts
as the "gatekeeper or regulator" of the thing protected. 30 4 In personam rights provide
a governance strategy with respect the use of resources, where "rights to resources
are defined in terms of permitted and restricted uses" and in rem rights provide and
exclusion strategy by "restricting access to a particular resource rather than by
specifying permitted or prohibited uses." 305 While the rights under the copyright
system have consistently been referred to as property rights, these rights in reality
are carefully enumerated rights in literary and artistic works that specifically
stipulate the rights to use in specific ways. 306 The rights to print, distribute, make
derivatives, publicly perform or display works on the copyright market under § 106
are exact rights to use creative works and is, as a matter of reality, a method of
governance of how these works are used by society. 30 7 Arguably the economic
incentives under section 106 do not provide copyright owners with a general right of
exclusion from use of the works. 308 Furthermore, the fair use provisions of section
107 and compulsory licensing for non-dramatic musical works of section 115 provide
specific limitations on the rights of the copyright owner, which prevents the copyright
owner from having "complete control over all possible uses of the work." 309 The
author's rights on the other hand, based on a theory of natural law that the author
has property in that which he creates and that all men have a right to pursue
knowledge, acknowledges a more general right of the author to exclude access to the
work from uses of the work, which contradicts his purposes for creating it-to

303

See Ng, Social Contrac4 supra note 25, at 464-65.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990).
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 30, at 789-92.
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Id.
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Id. at 791.

301
302

Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-17 (1985) ("A copyright.., comprises a series
of carefully defined and a carefully delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly
exact protections. 'Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner
of the copyright,' which include the rights 'to publish, copy and distribute the author's work."'
(quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1985))).
307 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 30, at 791.
306

See id.
Dow'ng, 473 U.S. at 217 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984).
308
309
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advance knowledge or promote the progress of science and the useful arts. 310 A
general right of exclusion of the in rem nature with author's is not inconsistent, and
may in fact be reconcilable, with the in personam nature of the economic incentives.
The statutory rights under section 106 provide a strategy that would allow copyright
owners to profit from the work on the market-in other words, making works
commercially valuable to reward creativity. 3 11 The author's rights under a more
general natural law theory allow authors to authentically express themselves
through their work-in other words, making the work intrinsically valuable to
reward authentic authorship devoted to promoting progress and advancing
knowledge.

A. The Right to Exclude
If we were to think of a larger ethics for the copyright system-to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts and advance knowledge for the benefit of
society through works of authentic authorship-we must acknowledge that the
author's property rights in his work would allow him to generally exclude society
from uses of the work. However, there is a substantial difference between the
exclusionary right of the author based on natural law and the exclusionary right of
copyright owners based on the economics of the copyright market, which has been
used to prevent even non-commercial uses of works. 3 12 The right of the author would
be based on a moral ideal: that works of authentic authorship will improve society
and contribute towards its betterment because as a matter of natural law, all men
ought to seek, desire, and want knowledge as a basic human need, 313 and an author,
writing with that purpose as an end, is, as a result, deserving of property rights to
recognize and protect his creativity and contribution. An author who writes for
progress and advancement of society would be entitled to, by virtue of a property
314
right he has in the work, exclude society from using the work as a general rule.
The right to exclude society from using the work would be consistent with the in rem
nature of property but as a matter of ethics or morality, an author ought to only
exercise a general right of exclusion when society uses the work in a way, which
unreasonably interferes, or affect, the author's authentic expression. 315 The use of a
chemistry book to build a home bomb system, for example, would be against the
author's purpose for creating the work and ethics of the copyright system. In this
situation the author would be entitled, both on legal and moral grounds, to exclude
society from use of the work. Economic incentives do not carry with them a general

310

See Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 466-69.

311 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228-29 (1990).
312 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, The Price of Music: The Overview; 261 Lawsuits Filed on Music
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at Al (reporting on the music recording industry filing
infringement lawsuits against individuals who share copyrighted music without charging a fee or
deriving economic benefit).
313 FINNIS, supranote 293, at 59-80.

314
315

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 30, at 789-92; Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 463

(citing Lacey, supra note 297, at 1548-49).
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right of exclusion even if the law current says they do. 316 Economic incentives grant
specific entitlements to perform certain acts with respect to a given resource.
Government created property rights, such as patents and copyright, do not entail an
in rem right to exclude but are rather in personam rights of governance with respect
to a resource. 317 For intellectual property, the government created property right is
intended to address the public good nature of information and prevent social
misappropriation of goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. 318 The "property
right" in intellectual property provides a legal mechanism to govern information
resources and use in the most efficient manner, 319 and ought not to include general
rights of exclusion against society for social uses of the work that is not in direct
competition with the business of the copyright owner or, which do not lower the
work's commercial value on the market. In government created property rights, such
as copyright, rights do not attach to a particular thing, but rather to certain uses of
the thing, and do not identify a person to manage the resource, but rather to use the
320
resource in the most efficient manner.

B. Market Dissemination
Economic privileges within the copyright system are intended to encourage
creation of commercially valuable works and to facilitate market dissemination of
these works. They serve a purpose: to put information resources in literary and
artistic works to the most economically efficient uses. 321 They are calibrated to
ensure that creators and publishers recover their investment in creating and
producing the work for the public, but they also ensure that the public has access to
322
the information in the work needed to spur new forms of creativity and innovation.
This is why doctrines such as idea/expression, merger, and fair use are so deeply
embedded within the fabric of copyright jurisprudence: the most economically
efficient use of a given resource would require a careful assessment of where
government-created property rights should end, so as to not create dead weight loses
upon society, and what kind of use rights society ought to have with respect the work
to ensure that the value of the work is maximized and that the work is put to its
most efficient use by society. 323 As the incentives provided for under section 106 are
designed to ensure a work's commercial marketability to encourage creativity and
dissemination, the economic privileges copyright owners have are entitlements to
316 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
317 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of Theoretical
Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 932 (2007).
318 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 37, 195, 370 (18th ed. 2005);
Stephen P. Anway, Mediation in Copyright Disputes: From Compromise Created Incentives to
Incentive CreatedCompromises, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 439, 450-52 (2003).
319 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking PatentLaw in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 127, 129-30, 135-36 (2000) (arguing that the patent system is a unilateral contract between
the government and general community of inventors).
320 Merrill & Smith, supra note 30, at 791.
321 Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 325-26.
322 See Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 420-23.
323 See Richard A. Posner, IntellectualProperty The Law and Economics Approach, J. ECON.
PERSP. 57, Spring 2005, at 63-65, 72-73.
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recover, from the market, the cost of producing a work. 324 These entitlements, when
of an in personam nature with respect to clearly permissible uses, ought not to be
used, as a matter of legal principle, as a general right to exclude society from uses of
the work that do not affect the commercial value of the work on the market-such as
the use of cartoon characters by fans. 325 Furthermore, it is also legally impossible to
"steal" a resource that is the subject matter of certain government enumerated uses,
326
and not the subject of ownership rights of the more exclusionary in rem nature.
Arguably, the economic incentives to disseminate creative works in the market
should only be enforced in special circumstances when the use of the work erodes the
incentive to perform any of the acts specified in section 106 on the copyright market.
A claim for copyright infringement of the economic privileges of the copyright owner
can only be legally justified when there is a clear case of unfair competition by a
market competitor using the work in infringement of the specific use-rights
enumerated by Congress under section 106.327

C. EncouragingA uthen tic Human Expression
As the copyright system is essentially economic centric, the inattention to
encouraging authentic human expression to promote progress of the sciences and the
useful arts is notable. The reason this is important, particularly from a moral and
ethical view point, is because of the propensity for creative works to sway the public
and society in particular directions, sometimes in ways that are only observable with
hindsight. 32 8 It is only with hindsight that we observe the effect of works such as
Mein Kampf and The Negro as Beast, which incited the lynching of 2,500 innocent
people between 1885 and 1990,329 on society. Authentic human expression with the
end purpose of promoting progress and advancing knowledge on the part of the
author or artist should be encouraged as a moral obligation within the copyright
system as authentic forms of authorship would make a more significant contribution
to the progress of science and the useful arts by refusing to give in to current
sentiments or tastes of the market audience. 330 Popular works do not necessarily
promote progress nor advance knowledge for the betterment of society, especially
when their authors write without that aim as an end. 331 D.W. Griffith's The Birth of
a Nation was a "masterpiece" in the eyes of the public when it was released in
1915.332 Particularly with Griffith's recreation of civil war battles, 333 the movie was
324 See Ng, Social Contract supra note 25, at 480.
325 LESSIG, supra note 19, at 182 (stating that the Fox network claimed to "own" the cartoon
characters of Bart Simpson and his father and disallowed fans from using them on a fan website).
326 See id. at 183 ("Copyright interests obsess about the ability for content to be 'stolen' ...
.
327 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2006).
328 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systematic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1260,
1264, 1277-78 (1992).
329 Id. at 1264.
330 See Cowen & Tabarrok, supra note 63, at 241.
331 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 328, at 1264-65.
332 Leslie Beatty, Griffith's Film Work Deserves Recognition, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER,
Mar. 1, 2004, at A7.
333 Director's GuildDrops Award Named for D. W. Griffith, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1999, at 2.
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praised for its "technical and artistic merits" 334 but it was also used by segments of
society to propagate racial stereotypes in immorally degrading ways. 335 While the
copyright system's primary philosophy is economic based, it is suggested that an
economic philosophy, which does not have moral principles or ethical benchmarks as
standards against which value judgments may be made, will be inconsistent with the
institution's general objectives of promoting the progress of science and the useful
arts for the improvement of society. 336 A system with such a goal as an end must
make value judgments as to the moral content of literary and artistic works that are
produced within its system. The creation of literary and artistic works in all forms
does not assure of progress in the direction envisioned by the Constitution. 337 The
creation of literary and artistic works with authentic content created to meet men's
basic need to pursue knowledge in the natural law sense most probably will.

IV. ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP AS A LEGAL STANDARD
The present legal standard for recognizing property rights in literary and
artistic works is low. 338 The law does not currently require that a work eligible for
copyright be unique, different from other works or novel. 339 According to the courts
in ALfred Be]] & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., the law does not require the same
340
standards of novelty required by patent law for the grant of a right in the work.
The court stated that "[a]ll that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the
statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial'
variation, something recognizably 'his own."' 341 The courts are also not inclined to
make any artistic judgment on the aesthetic value of the work, 342 and Justice Holmes
in Bleistein emphasized the dangers for "persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits." 343 However, this paper suggests a higher
standard of originality than the present, which ought to be introduced in deciding
when property rights may be first acquired in literary and artistic works that
represent an author's authentic expression that promotes progress and advances
knowledge. The standards for first acquisition of property rights in land and
chattels, including other forms of intellectual property besides copyright, is a
standard, which requires some form of appropriation, a setting aside and claiming
the property as one's own against other resources that are freely available to
Delgago & Stefancic, supra note 328, at 1265.
Id. There was a chase scene in which "a black man with animal-like traits pursues a young
white woman until she leaps to her death from a pedestal-like perch at the edge of a cliff." Id.
36 Ng,Social Contract, supra note 25, at 481.
387 See generally Oliar, supra note 90 (exploring the Framers' intent in creating the
"Intellectual Property Clause").
838 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)
("To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The
vast majority of works make the grade quite easily .. ").
39 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
840 Id. at 102-03.
34

335

341

Id.

842

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
at 251.

843 Id.
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society. 344 This standard is missing in copyright jurisprudence, and property rights
are recognized in literary and artistic works based on the slightest variation of a
work from other works that are in existence in the public. 345 It is therefore possible
that there may be "a plurality of valid copyrights directed to closely identical or even
identical works. Moreover, none of them, if independently arrived at without
copying, will constitute an infringement of the copyright of the others." 346 This
minimal standard however, signifies a lower legal expectation for recognizing
property rights in literary and artistic works, and serves to discourage authors and
artists from engaging in the production of works of individual and authentic
authorship of a higher moral standard that are aligned with the Constitutional goals
of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, thereby shifting the focus of
authorial effort towards profiting from the economic privileges of statutory copyright
towards market gains.
It is suggested here that Courts should not be deterred by the lack of clearly
defined parameters as to what kinds of works are of authentic authorship that will
contribute towards the advancement of knowledge nor shy away from making value
34 7
judgments about the moral content of works. Justice Stewart in Jacobellis . Ohio,
commenting on whether the film "The Lovers" before the Court was obscene, decided
that it wasn't but began his judgment with what is known as "one of the most famous
phrases in the entire history of the Supreme Court opinions" 34 8-that what amounted
349
to obscenity is difficult to define, but if confronted with it, "I know it when I see it."
In the same light, judges will know whether a work will contribute towards progress
and the advancement of knowledge when they see it. Seditious works do not promote
progress nor advance knowledge. Works inciting hatred and encouraging
discrimination also do not. Materials encouraging immoral, illegal and dangerous
conduct may be literary and artistic creations for the purposes of the copyright
system but if judges make value judgments, they will intuitively know that these
works may not be considered works of authorship for property rights to be granted
and their creator, not an author, whom the law would consider to be an owner.

A. FirstAcquisition ofPropertyRights
Property law generally recognizes first property rights in land or chattels in one
of five ways-first possession, discovery, creation, accession, and adverse
possession. 35 0 In all instances, save for literary and artistic works, is a legal
requirement that the person seeking property rights assert some form of ownership

344

See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).

345 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345

(1991).

Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 (citation omitted).
378 U.S. 184 (1964).
348 Paul Gerwitz, On "IKnowlt When I-See It" 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1023 (1996).
349 Jacobellis,378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
350 E.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (first possession); Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S. 543 (1823) (discovery); Omaha Standard, Inc. v. Nissen, 187 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa Sup. Ct.
1971) (accession); Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95 (N. 1952) (adverse possession).
346

347
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in the property claimed by acquiring it.351 In other areas of intellectual property,
such as patents and trademarks, rights are only acquired and granted after some
significant effort is exerted to distinguish the property claimed from other property in
society. 35 2 For patents, there is a requirement that the invention in which patent is
claimed be novel and non-obvious, 35 3 and for trademarks, ownership is only granted
when the mark has been used in commerce in connection with goods or services in
the marketplace to set aside the good from other goods on the market. 354 The trivial
variation from existing works, which copyright law presently requires as a legal
standard, do not hold authors to a higher standard of authorship: they are not
required to produce works that would contribute to the progress of science and the
useful arts nor is it required that their works be sufficiently distinct from other
works to justify ownership rights in a particular "thing."35 5 Creators of literary and
artistic works are not under a moral obligation to produce works with content that
will advance knowledge. There are presently no articulated ethical standards to hold
authors, who write for an audience morally responsible for the content they create.
To be eligible for property rights from a natural law perspective, rights ought to be
granted in literary and artistic creations that are the authentic expressions of
authors, which satisfy society's natural right to pursue knowledge. 356 The work
ought to be an individual effort by the author to meet the Constitutional goals of
advancing knowledge or promoting progress, and not merely a trivial variation from
the existing pool of creative works that are already available to society, for ownership
rights of the in rem nature to attach to. The work has to be a clearly identifiable
"thing" to belong to the author and the author must have distinguished the work
sufficiently from the pool of creative works to be deemed the "owner" of the work
before general exclusionary rights can be exercised against society and the general
public.

B. In Rem andIn Personam Rights
The importance of setting a higher standard for first acquisition of property
rights in literary and artistic works is because of the weight of the rights claimed by
authors in their work if they are rights that pertain to property in the work. The
right of the author to exclude the rest of the world from use of the work as the owner
is an absolute right in real property law. 35 7 The right in rem attaches to a property
and a use of the property against the wishes of the owner is a trespass of the owner's
351

See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh, 304 N.Y. at 98 (requiring "occupation under a claim of titld' for

a finding of adverse possession) (emphasis added).
352 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2006).
35335 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
35415 U.S.C. § 1051.
355See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346
(1991) (requiring only a "modicum of creativity" to satisfy the originality requirement).
356 Ng, Social Contract,supra note 25, at 467
357 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) ("[Tlhe right to exclude others [is] 'one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."'
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))); see also Jacque v. Steenberg
Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Wis. 1997) (exemplifying a property owner's absolute right to
exclude in the context of a landowner and a trespasser).
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rights. 35 8 By setting the legal standard for first acquisition of property rights in
literary and artistic work on a higher standard, the law will be able to distinguish
this right from the economic rights that publishers, printers and distributors of
literary and artistic works obtain by way of statute-resource governance use-rights
of an in personam nature. The author, by virtue of the property right, may exclude
society from uses of his work as a matter of law. However, an ethics for the copyright
system will make authors morally obliged to convey their works to society for uses
that will promote progress and make their works accessible for the purposes of
advancing knowledge. 35 9 Statutory entitlement in literary and artistic works
however, provide a personal interest, or an interest in personam, to copyright owners
to generate profits from the market commercialization of the work, and as a matter of
law, cannot be exercised in a way to generally exclude society for two reasonseconomic incentives do not relate to a thing (they relate to certain uses of a thing)
and do not conceive of an owner by which the thing could be owned (copyright owners
under the copyright statute are rather right holders). These two distinct rights in
literary and artistic works, I think, will ensure that authors engage in creative
production and dissemination of literary and artistic works for society's benefit: the
right in rem generates authorial creativity and production of authentic works of
authorship to meet the end goals of progress and the advancement of knowledge, and
the rights in personam encourages market dissemination of these works to the
general public.

C PropertyRights of the Authors
Having established that the foremost right of an author as a property owner of
the work is the particular right to exclude the rest of the world from actions that will
affect the work, it is important to note that the author will be legally entitled to
exclude actions by the public with respect to the property, which he has not
consented to. As the property right to exclude is attached to a particular work of
authorship, the author cannot justify controlling the actions of the public, when their
actions do not affect the authentic expression of the author, particularly when the
author is morally obliged to create works for social betterment. Just as a home
owner who plants beautiful flowers on his property cannot prevent his neighbor from
receiving the pollen bees bring from his flowers onto his neighbor's land, an author
cannot prevent society from benefitting from his work by claiming that the work is
protected as his property. The right to exclude is therefore a unique negative right in
the property to prevent uses of the property without the owner's consent, and this
right imposes a duty on others to refrain from actions that will affect the rights of the
property owner with respect to the property. 36 0 In the same way, an author's
property right, which is grounded in natural precepts, is also a negative right to
ownership of the work and its expressive content, as opposed to positive rights of use.
Being a negative right, the exercise of the right to exclude by a property owner
requires a defined property or identifiable thing to exclude others from. There must
358 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159-60.
359 See Ng, Social Contrac4 supra note 25, at 467.
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be a requirement that a thing be appropriated to the owner's self and capable of
exclusive possession by its owner before a right to exclude others from a property can
be maintained, and for the right to be of practical legal value to its owner. 36 1 The
imposition of a duty upon the rest of the world to respect a property owner's right to
exclude others from the property carries with it a requirement that the property
owner conveys the intention to appropriate the property from the common area,
which available to the rest of the world, is out of the parameters of claimed property
that the property owner carves out from society for himself.36 2 In Pierson v. Post,the
fox hunting case of first possession that sets the rules establishing new roots of title,
and first property rights, in an animal pursued over common ground, the court held
that the mere pursuit of an animal, without appropriating the animal and bringing it
within the control of the hunter precluded a finding of a new root of title by way of
first possession. 36 3 It is only when the hunter, in the words of Tompkins J.,
"manifests an unequivocal intention of appropriating the animal to his individual
use, has deprived him of his natural liberty, and brought him within his certain
36 4
control" that first possession, establishing a new property right, may be found.
The right to exclude is therefore premised on an unequivocal act by the property
owner to possess the property within defined parameters, setting the property aside
from commonly held property, which will permit the property owner to control use of
the property, and exercise exclusive dominion and possession of the property against
365
the rest world.
In the same token, authors are bound to treat literary and artistic works in the
same fashion as a property owner is bound to treat the property with respect to the
property he owns. An author therefore may exercise the right to exclude others from
the use of his creative work if he has done something to appropriate the property
claimed and prevent others from using the work by exercising the right to exclude.
This may be demonstrated by a work of authentic authorship created to promote the
progress of science and advance knowledge. The author however, is restricted in
what he can do with the work once it has been distributed to the public, for there will
be positive externalities, such as the ability of society to use the work in ways
facilitated by new technologies, which the author cannot rightfully control by seeking
366
to expand set property rights into areas that are essentially the public domain.
Where the use affects the author's personality or individuality, such as an act, which
affects the author's expressive content or authentic authorship, the author is justified
in exercising the right to exclude since creative rights never leave the author, even
when the economic incentives to profit from the publication and distribution have
36 7
been assigned to a printer, publisher and distributor.
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CONCLUSION: THE AUTHOR'S RIGHTS

The philosophical basis for the copyright system as it stands presently over
emphasizes an economic idea-that the progress of science and the useful arts may
be best achieved by encouraging authors to create as much works as possible through
private monopolies. 368 This economic idea requires a robust and content-neutral
market to fulfill that goal and the grant of certain exclusive rights to protect nonrival and non-exclusive works from misappropriation. 36 9 The grant of governmentcreated property rights in literary and artistic works to ensure the most economically
efficient uses of information resources requires a difficult, if not impossible, balance
of private and public interests in creative works.
Private copyright owners
consistently seek an extension of government granted monopolies over uses of
literary works and the public, on the other hand, consistently seek legitimate needs
for and rights to access. 370 These conflicting approaches to the copyright system
creates dilemma and highlights the tension created by the grant of temporary
monopolies over literary and artistic works to encourage the creativity for the benefit
of society. Neoclassicist and copyright minimalist viewpoints provide an economic
centric approach towards analyzing authorial rights but offer limited normative
guidance on the treatment of the issues involved. 371 A legal interpretation the
authors rights from a property law perspective provides a middle-ground approach to
the copyright dilemma by suggesting that the author's rights in literary and artistic
works are really two fold comprising a right in rem based on an author's property
right in the work by virtue of the author's original authorship and creative
production that good against the world, and an economic right in personam to recover
profits from the commercialization of the work, which stems from the statutory rights
provided for under the copyright system. 372 The separation of property rights, which
belongs to an author, and economic incentives, which authors may freely assign to
printers, publishers and distributors puts copyright jurisprudence on a more stable
foundation allowing the law to evolve through legally accepted principles of property
law, which will acknowledge and encourage authors to undertake individual
expressive creations of authentic authorship that contributes to scientific and artistic
progress, and which will afford greater confidence and respect in the legal system of
comprising rights and duties of the author, his publisher/distributor, and the
public. 373 More importantly however, this distinction opens a much desired door into
an ethics for the copyright system to hold authors and society to a moral obligation to
produce and use works of authentic authorship for the advancement of knowledge
and the betterment of society. A more complete inquiry into an ethics for the
copyright system, while briefly explored here, is of course, the subject of another
paper.
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